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ABSTRACT 
 
           Recent academic work on the powers of the nation state has argued that nation 
state’s position as the predominant unit of social organization is being diminished 
from outside by forces of globalization and through the shift of power from the 
national to the supra and transnational levels. It is also argued that the nation state’s 
legitimacy, authority and integrative capacities are weakened form within by an 
increasing number of claims for special group rights emphasizing cultural difference. 
Not surprisingly, migrants and ethnic minorities have been at the forefront of these 
claims; arguably contributing through their claims making both to the external erosion 
of sovereignty and to internal cultural differentiation.  
           Post-nationalists argue that citizenship and welfare rights possessed and 
otherwise demanded by non-citizens contribute to the erosion and transcending of the 
frontiers of nation-states while migrant communities increasingly take on the character 
of transnational communities taking advantage of transnational political opportunities. 
Multiculturalists, in turn, argue that the liberal nation state is challenged when migrant 
minorities question the conception of a unified undifferentiated citizenship by putting 
forward demands for special group rights and for the recognition of cultural 
difference. 
          A third strand of thought has emerged in response to these claims from supra-
nationalists and multiculturalists emphasizing the continuing importance of the nation-
state particularly  in shaping migrant experience in general and migrant claims making 
in particular.  Scholars have analyzed the citizenship configurations of nation-states as 
the explanatory variable in explaining different strategies in dealing with ethnic 
difference and the different manifestations of these strategies in different countries.    
           In contrast to the above summarized polemical opposition of nation-state bound 
approaches on the one hand and an unbounded supra-nationalism on the other, I argue 
that host/home country influences, extra nation-state influences and group 
ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making through mechanisms 
like attribution of opportunity or threat and internalization. To specify the role of 
these factors in influencing migrant claims making and the inner workings of these 
mechanisms, I analyzed Milli Gorus Germany claims through content analyses of 
organizational media and observed changes and trends in the nature of this claims 
making. I also documented Milli Gorus Germany’s organizational ties and conducted 
open-ended interviews with organization members to understand what factors have 
influenced these trends and changes. 
              My findings show that understanding migrant claims making necessitates 
long term case study analyses of the claims making strategies of particular migrant 
groups.  While national citizenship models do have an influence on the nature of 
migrant claims making in a particular country, claims making strategies of migrant 
groups are also influenced by home country, supra/transnational and intra-group 
changes.  
         First, my empirical analysis shows that Milli Gorus Germany claims emerge as 
an outcome of broad change processes (national or international) which are attributed 
as threats and opportunities depending on the ideological/religious identification of 
group. Second, I show that extra-nation state pressures and events can unexpectedly 
lead to a very domesticated claims making due to internalization which I claim is 
dependant on an already emerging host-country orientation within the immigrant 
group.  
         I argue that my focus on dynamic processes and mechanisms linking the local 
and global not only helps us to trace and explain changes in the nature of Milli Gorus   
Germany claims making over time, but it also enables us to understand the interaction 
of the local and the global. The global doesn’t always rule the local and the local 
doesn’t always rule the global. They interact in previously undetermined ways to 
affect migrant claims making through processes like attribution of threat and 
opportunity and internalization and create different claims making strategies over time 
and between different groups.     iii  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
           Recent academic work on the powers of the nation state has argued that nation 
state’s position as the predominant unit of social organization is being diminished 
from outside by forces of globalization and through the shift of power from the 
national to the supra and transnational levels. It is also argued that the nation state’s 
legitimacy, authority and integrative capacities are weakened form within by an 
increasing number of claims for special group rights emphasizing cultural difference. 
Not surprisingly, migrants and ethnic minorities have been at the forefront of these 
claims; arguably contributing through their claims making both to the external erosion 
of sovereignty and to internal cultural differentiation.  
         The essential role played by minorities in eroding the powers of the nation state 
has mainly been stressed by post-nationalist scholars. Post-nationalists argue that the 
residence and welfare rights given to these non-citizens rest on claims to universal 
rights of personhood based on international human rights conventions and not any 
more on traditional definitions of citizenship. These rights possessed and otherwise 
demanded by non-citizens contribute to the erosion and transcending of the frontiers 
of nation states while migrant communities increasingly take on the character of 
transnational communities taking advantage of transnational political opportunities.  
          Another group of scholars emphasizing the erosion of the powers of the nation 
state are multiculturalists. Like post-nationalists, multiculturalists argue that 
international conventions providing for a right to one’s own culture have greatly 
improved the opportunities for migrants and ethnic minorities to push for the 
recognition of their cultural difference by the nation state. Second; multiculturalists 
argue that traditional models for integrating migrants through assimilation into the  
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majority culture no longer work. (Kymlica, 1995) In this case it is not the nation-
state’s external sovereignty that is at stake but its capacity to maintain social cohesion 
and the liberal conception of individual rights on which it rests. Problems for the 
liberal nation state arise when migrant minorities challenge the conception of a unified 
undifferentiated citizenship by increasingly putting forward demands for special group 
rights and recognition of cultural difference. 
          A third strand of thought has emerged in response to these claims from supra-
nationalists and multiculturalists emphasizing the continuing importance of the nation 
state particularly  in shaping migrant experience in general and migrant claims making 
in particular.  Building on Brubaker’s (1992) work, a number of scholars have 
analyzed the citizenship configurations of nation states as the explanatory variable in 
explaining different strategies in dealing with ethnic difference and the different 
manifestations of these strategies in different countries. (Koopmans and Statham, 
1999) According to them; two important dimensions of citizenship regimes determine 
the degree and form of inclusiveness/ exclusiveness of a national regime with respect 
to minorities: the criteria for formal access to citizenship and the cultural obligations 
that this access to citizenship brings. For the first dimension, scholars distinguish 
between an ethno-cultural and civic territorial basis of criteria for attributing full 
citizenship, with the ethno-cultural being the more closed and civic-territorial the more 
open version. For the second dimension, they focus on the distinction between 
assimilationism and cultural pluralism as the condition which a state places on 
attributing citizenship; with assimilationism being the more demanding and cultural 
pluralism the more accepting option. 
         The above mentioned configurations of citizenship have important consequences 
both for the incorporation of migrants and for their political mobilization. Resources 
of access to the political community make a significant difference in the potential of  
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migrant actors to mobilize and press their claims for social and political change. 
Therefore, far from losing its powers to transnational institutions and communities, the 
nation state remains by far the most important factor in shaping migrant claims 
making.  
          In contrast to the above summarized polemical opposition of nation-state bound 
approaches on the one hand and an unbounded supra-nationalism on the other, I argue 
that host/home country influences, extra nation-state influences and group 
ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making through certain 
mechanisms like attribution of opportunity or threat and internalization. To specify 
the role of these factors in influencing migrant claims making and the inner workings 
of these mechanisms, I analyzed Milli Gorus Germany
1 claims through content 
analyses of organizational media and observed changes and trends in the nature of this 
claims making. I also documented Milli Gorus Germany’s
2 organizational ties and 
conducted open-ended interviews with organization members to understand what 
factors have influenced these trends and changes. 
        Below, I first present related academic work on ethnic politics and migration, 
discuss methodological problems haunting the study of migrant claims making and 
then show how a single handed focus on national citizenship regimes can be 
insufficient in explaining different types of migrant claims making. Finally, I analyze 
Milli Gorus Germany claims making over time as a case study of migrant claims 
making, to show how host/home country and extra nation-state influences and group 
ideological/religious orientations affect migrant claims making.   
 
                                                 
1 Milli Gorus Germany or IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus) is the second biggest Islamic 
organization and the second biggest Turkish organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the 
Turkish state. 
2 I use IGMG and Milli Gorus Germany interchangeably throughout the paper.   
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CHAPTER 1 
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON CONTENTION OVER ETHNIC 
RELATIONS AND MIGRATION POLITICS 
  
       Ethnic relation politics- the contentious politics where a state’s policies deal with 
resident migrants and minorities and where influential political actors such as parties, 
interest groups and majority/minority publics dispute the criteria for entry to the 
national community, and immigration politics have emerged as central issues within 
European polities since the 1990s. (Koopmans and Statham, 2000) Ethnic relations 
and migration have been transformed into a central field of political contention as a 
result of the ethnic pluralization of European societies which has been an outcome of 
past and present immigration. 
         In response to the emerging contentiousness of ethnic relations and migration 
politics, the concept of citizenship- the set of rights, duties, and identities linking 
citizens to the nation state- has emerged as an essential tool in carrying out 
comparative research in ethnic relations and migration politics. Following upon the 
distinction between “ethnic and civic” forms of nationalism, Brubaker (1992), in his 
ground breaking book, has explained the divergent ways in which France and 
Germany have dealt with post-war migrants by the different ‘cultural idioms’ of 
citizenship-based on ethno-cultural belonging in Germany and on civic-cultural and 
political institutions in France- that have historically guided institutional practices and 
legal traditions in the two nation states. In Brubaker’s (1992) work, citizenship is seen 
not only as a form of membership but also as a form of symbolic closure restricting 
the ability of migrants to join the national community. Thus, the persistently higher 
naturalization rates in France compared to Germany is explained by the jus soli 
acquisition of citizenship, which is the French model of citizenship, where access is  
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either automatic by birth or easily available by naturalization, in comparison to jus 
sanguinis, the German basis of citizenship, where access is difficult for those who do 
not have ethnic cultural ties to the nation.  
         Although ground-breaking in its time, Brubaker’s distinction between ethno-
cultural and civic–cultural forms of citizenship largely ignores the level of cultural 
difference migrant minorities are allowed to exhibit in particular polities. (Koopmans 
and Statham, 1999) This leads him to overstate the ‘openness’ of the French 
citizenship regime which does provide easy formal access to citizenship, but expects 
new citizens of migrant origin to assimilate to a unitary national political culture. 
           To be able to bring the cultural rights dimension of citizenship regimes absent 
in Brubaker’s analysis into their analysis, many scholars of ethnic relations and 
migration have tried to combine the formal criteria for access to citizenship central in 
Brubaker’s analysis with a cultural rights dimension; to come up with three types of 
citizenship regimes defining a particular institutional and discursive setting for 
contention over migration and ethnic relations. (Castles & Miller, 1993) 
           Within this typology, the first type called ethnic or exclusive, denies migrants 
and their descendants access to the political community or at least makes such access 
very difficult through high institutional and cultural barriers. The second type, labeled 
assimilationist or republican, provides for easy access to citizenship but requires from 
migrants a high degree of assimilation in the public sphere and gives little or no 
recognition to cultural difference. Finally, multicultural or pluralist regimes provide 
both an easy formal access to citizenship and recognition of the right of ethnic 
minorities to maintain their cultural difference.  
           Although one step ahead of Brubaker’s typology in recognizing the role of 
cultural rights in shaping migrant experience, this static typological formulation 
obscures the dynamic aspects of the process (i.e. changes in citizenship over time) and  
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the important differences within states, both among different actors (i.e. different 
parties, different government agencies, etc.) and among those applied to different 
categories of migrants. (i.e. between asylum seekers, guest workers, etc.) 
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Figure 1: A two dimensional space for situating conceptions of citizenship. The boxes 
are ideal- typical types. They usually don’t exist in reality. There are four ideal typical 
configurations of citizenship and migrant incorporation that arise from the 
combination of the vertical and horizontal axes. Source: Koopmans and Statham, 2000 
          Koopmans and Statham (1999) claim to have solved these problems by studying 
citizenship not as static typological models or regimes but as a conceptual and political 
space in which different actors and policies can be situated and developments can be 
traced over time. They define the contours of this conceptual space by both formal and 
cultural dimensions of citizenship (see Diagram 1) and argue that in this conceptual 
and political space, the stability of citizenship regimes and the uniformity with which  
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they cover different political actors, policies and immigrant groups are not taken for 
granted but become issues for empirical investigation.   
 
 
MIGRATION AND ETHNIC RELATIONS AS A FIELD OF POLITICAL 
CONTENTION: AN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE APPROACH 
            In studying migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention, 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) take conceptions of citizenship as a subset or as a 
specification of the general dimensions of political opportunity structures particular to 
the field of contention over migration and ethnic relations. While benefiting from the 
theoretical advancement of the ‘political opportunity structure’ approach, their work 
also exhibits many of its defects. Below, I first present a brief outline of the political 
opportunity structure approach and point to the similarities of Koopmans and 
Statham’s approach to the POS approach, discuss my criticisms of the POS approach 
and then present my way of overcoming these problems in the study of migrant claims 
making.  
         Political opportunity structures consist of ‘consistent- but not necessarily formal 
or permanent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for 
people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or 
failure.’ (Tarrow, 1994:85) The opening up of access to participation, shifts in ruling 
alignments, the availability of influential allies, cleavages within and among elites 
(Tarrow 1994:86), national cleavage structures, formal institutional structures, 
informal procedures and prevailing strategies and alliance structures (Kriesi et al, 
1995: xiii-xvi) are among the most important, and frequently-referred-to 
conceptualizations of the concept of ‘political opportunity structure’.   
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           According to Koopmans and Statham (1999) discussions on citizenship and 
nationhood can be translated into the language of political opportunities and vice 
versa. Conceptions of citizenship and nationhood are first of all part of a nation’s 
cleavage structure. Generally, one may expect greater contestation over issues related 
to citizenship in countries in which the conception of the nation has historically been a 
contested issue. Second; citizenship also has a formal institutional dimension which 
especially affects the opportunities of access of migrants to the political system. For 
example, migrants and minorities have greater access to the political system where 
they are officially recognized, their organizations facilitated and where their claims 
can refer to existing legal frameworks for equal opportunity, anti-discrimination and 
cultural rights. Third; national configurations of citizenship reflect prevailing 
strategies for dealing with societal cleavages and conflicts. Finally; controversies over 
citizenship and nationhood are important determinants of the alliance and conflict 
structures in the politics of migration and ethnic relations. Elite decisions and 
changing alignments over these issues might particularly enhance the opportunities for 
challengers from below if such controversies are not limited to more or less technical 
discussions of immigration control and minority integration but become framed in 
terms of the deep cultural idioms of citizenship and nationhood. 
 
TOWARDS A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXTENDING THE POS 
APPROACH 
 
        The above summarized concept of political opportunity structure is an essential 
component of the classical social movement agenda which theorizes that for collective 
action to take place, social change processes initiate a process of change and trigger 
changes in the political, cultural and economic environment, creating political  
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opportunities and constraints for a given challenger. These political opportunities vary 
over time and these variations shape the nature of a movement’s activity. (Kriesi, 
1996) Once these political opportunities are in place, forms of organization offer 
insurgents sites for initial mobilization and shape their capacity to exploit their new 
resources. (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) Between political opportunities and action, 
framing which is defined as a collective process of interpretation, attribution and 
social construction mediates to make sure that people feel aggrieved at some aspect of 
their lives and are optimistic that action can redress the problem. (Snow et al, 1986) 
Finally, repertoires of contention act as another form of resource for activists, by 
offering the means by which people engage in collective action. (Tilly, 1978)       
         Such a portrayal of collective action has been criticized and revised by multiple 
scholars. (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, McAdam et al., 2001). McAdam (2001) et al., 
for example, who are themselves among the creators of the classical social movement 
agenda, criticize it for its focus on static relationships, for its lack of attention to 
broader episodes of contention in comparison to individual social movements, its 
emphasis on opportunities rather than threats, its focus on the expansion of 
organizational resources rather than on organizational deficits and its focus only on the 
origins of contention rather than the whole episode of contention. 
         Goodwin and Jasper (2004) on the other hand, criticize the classical social 
movement agenda for its strong structural bias, for its tendency to stretch the concept 
of political opportunity structure to cover a wide variety of empirical phenomena and 
causal mechanisms, and for its lack of recognition of the diverse ways that culture and 
agency, including emotions and strategizing shape collective action. Below I discuss 
some of these criticisms and show how these problems can be overcome in the study 
of migrant claims making.   
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A.  Getting Rid of Static Typologies 
 
       Even though themselves critics of static typologies theoretically, Koopmans and 
Statham (1999) remain confined to the static nature of the political opportunity 
structure approach in their empirical analysis. While studying the nature of migrant 
claims making in Germany and Britain over a period of 6 years (1990-1995), they 
seem to forget their own criticism against static typologies and claim that Germany is 
a country with ethno-cultural exclusionist citizenship where non-ethnic migrants are 
incorporated into the labor market, but where it is difficult for them to attain access to 
the political community. In contrast, they argue that Britain’s citizenship model tends 
toward the multicultural pluralist type where most resident minorities have full equal 
social and political rights while retaining much of their cultural difference from the 
majority society.      
         According to Koopmans and Statham (1999), within the European context, 
Germany and Britain represent in many respects diametrically opposed incorporation 
regimes and these regimes have important consequences for the identities, forms of 
organizations and types of claims of ethnic minorities. Germany sees immigrants as 
foreigners, and that is exactly the way in which German minorities behave: they 
organize and identify themselves on the basis of their national origin and are still, in 
spite of residing in Germany for several decades, preoccupied with the politics of their 
homelands. By contrast, the British multicultural state treats its immigrants as racial 
and cultural minorities within British society and that is how British migrants behave. 
They mobilize as blacks or British Muslims and make claims on the British state for 
equal opportunity and multicultural rights. 
       Instead of studying two countries’ citizenship regimes as diametrically opposed 
static models, I argue for a dynamic process oriented approach in the study of migrant  
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claims making. My way of getting rid of static typologies and “dynamizing” the 
analysis of migrant claims making stresses first, a methodological focus on the claims 
of a single type of group over time, to understand what factors affect the nature of 
claims making of this particular group. I am not denying that national citizenship 
regimes have an essential influence on migrant experience but understanding how 
changes in these regimes and changes in other types of factors affect different kinds of 
groups in different ways necessitates different methods.  
         I also argue that there is no predetermined causal relationship between any static 
variable and domestic or transnational activism. Instead, I focus on mechanisms which 
are “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified elements in 
identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001:11) What differ are the circumstances in which they occur and their 
combination or sequence with other mechanisms. Processes are “recurring 
combinations of such mechanisms that can be observed in a variety of episodes of 
contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001:11)    
        Therefore, instead of lumping a huge number of “claims making groups” in a 
single country together, I focus on a single group in a single country to study how 
changes in for example, conceptions of citizenship affect its claims making over time 
and through which mechanisms. I argue that such an approach enables us to 
understand how different factors affect different types of groups and why.  
 
B. Bringing Culture Back In   
 
        McAdam et al., (2001) claim that it is possible to dynamize the classical social 
movement agenda by seeing “opportunities and threats” not as objective structural 
factors but as subject to attribution. The attribution of opportunity or threat, according  
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to them, is an activating mechanism that operates between political opportunities and 
mobilization. No opportunity will invite mobilization unless it is visible to potential 
challengers, and is perceived as an opportunity.  
               Koopmans and Statham (2000) also seem to agree with this revision to the 
classical social movement agenda and claim that only perceived realities can affect 
collective action and therefore we should focus on the type of political opportunities 
that are rendered publicly visible. They also claim to have answered criticisms 
pointing to the lack of culture and strategy in the classical social movement agenda by 
including the framing perspective in the analysis of success for social movement 
organizations. 
           They argue that the likelihood of success for challengers who attempt to 
mobilize their claims in the public sphere is dependent on their ability to achieve three 
strategic aims: visibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Firstly; a collective actor and her 
aims must be rendered publicly visible. Secondly; the mobilized challenge must 
provoke public reactions from other actors: the claims must resonate and carry the 
contention to a wider public. Thirdly; no matter how much visibility and resonance a 
challenge achieves, it will only achieve a level of success when it becomes a 
legitimate contention. This means that an actor has to legitimate herself and her claims 
in public by resonating positively in the reactions of a significant number of other 
actors.  
          Even though Koopmans and Statham’s (2000) attempt to include culture and 
strategy in their analysis by using the framing perspective in the study of success for 
social movement organizations is a step in the right direction, more needs to be done 
to incorporate culture and strategy into our analysis. I argue that we should move away 
from analyzing the static effect of either structural or cultural variables on  
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mobilization and instead focus on how structural and cultural processes unfold and 
interact within a contentious episode.  
           To this end, I suggest studying the mechanism of “attribution of opportunity or 
threat” used by McAdam et al., to dynamize the classical social movement agenda. In 
addition to dynamizing our agenda, studying the inner workings of this mechanisms 
and its relation to other types of mechanisms can be the answer to the ‘culture 
problem’ in the study of contention.   
            I argue that attribution of opportunity or threat is dependant on certain 
characteristics of contentious groups. Like Koopmans and Statham (2001) who 
include collective identities of migrant groups as the third component of the triad of 
determinants of migrant claims making and like Kuru (1995), I attribute a central role 
to collective identities and ideologies of groups. I argue that migrant groups’ 
belonging in a specific ethnic group, their religious and racial identification, and of 
course their degree of attachment to the country of origin are factors affecting the 
mechanism: “attribution of opportunity or threat”.  
          Including the ethnic, religious, racial identification of a specific group and 
tracing the changes in this identification provides a way to incorporate culture into our 
analysis, a way to dynamize it and to understand why certain changes in the political 
or discursive dimensions of institutions ignite mobilization for certain groups and 
don’t for others or do ignite mobilization for a particular group at a certain period and 
don’t at another period.     
 
C. Bringing in the Extra Nation-State Influences 
 
        Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) emphasis on national citizenship regimes falls 
within the boundaries of a prevailing argument in recent literature that holds  
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institutions and the political opportunity structures of host societies as the most 
consequential factors if not the causal forces shaping and constraining immigrants’ 
political action.  
         This overemphasis on institutional explanations encourages a systematic 
reduction of the various forms of immigrant strategy to a unified causal force defined 
as the political opportunity structure. Everything happens as if a straightforward causal 
link could always be established between immigrants’ political mobilization and host 
country institutions. (Bousetta 2000, Yurdakul, 2006) This begs the question of 
whether every single ethnic mobilization strategy is POS driven or not.            
         The problems of an overemphasis on host country POS are made obvious by the 
inability of POS models to provide parsimonious explanations for the observation that 
different types and levels of mobilization are generally observed between different 
ethnic groups and even between different ideologically oriented groups of the same 
ethnic group who share similar citizenship statuses within the same society. For 
example as Statham (1999) reports; whereas the strategies of African Caribbeans 
comply with the racialized identities institutionalized by the British race relations 
policy framework, this is not the case for minorities from the Indian subcontinent. For 
the latter group mobilization takes place mainly with reference to the Muslim identity. 
Yurdakul (2006) also stresses the divergent strategies and goals of two Turkish 
immigrant associations in Germany showing that immigrant associations are not 
homogeneous, nor are passive entities in a social vacuum.   
          As a remedy to this overemphasis on POS, Bousetta (2000) argues in favor of 
combining a micro (processes within an ethnic community), a median (public 
articulation of claims and mobilization) and a macro (state action and policies) level of 
analysis in explaining migrant claim making. Yurdakul (2006) strives for a focus on  
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the power positions and in-group conflicts within immigrant groups and the interaction 
of these with the political organizations of the receiving society.  
           Ogelman (2003) develops a theory with multiple levels of analysis in 
explaining the persistence of homeland focused politics among Turks in Germany. He 
argues that just like host country national citizenship models, analysis of the sending 
country political opportunity structure and other homeland developments provide 
some information on the nature of migrant claims making. As the sending country’s 
political opportunity structure fluctuates dramatically, migrant associations respond to 
this by making claims. Particularly in Germany, migrant associations take their 
mobilizing cues also from developments in Turkish politics where deep ethnic, 
religious, economic and political conflicts have continuously emerged (Yapp, 1991: 
155-163).  
        Ogelman (2003) focuses on the role of a transnational political opportunity 
structure which links the home country with the host country. His TPOS concept 
integrates the attitude of the government of the immigration country towards migrants’ 
political participation and how it attempts to incorporate migrants through integration 
models. (i.e. the types of citizenship countries use for politically including or 
excluding immigrants and emigrants.) with the attitude of the government of the 
country of origin towards its nationals abroad and their descendents as embodied in 
emigration models and remigration policies. And finally, Ogelman (2003) sees TPOS 
also as including the past and present international relations between these two 
countries. These relations may be important when state actors create international 
norms that affect transnational network formation in addition to relations concerning 
immigrants such as guest worker treaties and post colonial relations.  
              I argue that the role of external influences to migrant claims making can not 
be reduced to Ogelman’s combination of political opportunity structures in the country  
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of residence, the country of origin and the historically evolved international relations 
between them. Today, as nations and organizations become more interconnected, new 
political opportunities are emerging across the transnational, national and subnational 
arenas. (Tarrow 2002) With these three levels of opportunity more closely linked, the 
internal dynamics shaping movement development are increasingly supplemented and 
at times altered by external events and influences. (Carming and Hicks, 2002) 
Unfortunately, the influence of external factors on domestic activism remains to be 
under-theorized.  
            In an attempt to solve the dilemma of incorporating external influences into the 
theoretical model, one turns to Soysal (1997) who argues that a single handed 
emphasis on the role of the nation state in shaping migrant experience is inadequate. 
Soysal (1997) argues that political communities take shape independently of 
nationally delimited collectives and the social and political stages of claims making 
grow within and beyond the nation state. In her research, she shows that Islamic 
groups appeal to universalistic principles of human rights; draw upon host country and 
world level repertoires for making claims and cross and bridge a diverse set of public 
places.  
             Studies like Soysal’s (1997) show us that certain groups make claims by 
appealing to universal rights, set up trans/supranational organizational structures and 
target trans/supranational institutions, but these studies fail to explain how. They also 
fail to study the influence of factors spanning nationally bounded spaces other than 
supranational institutions and norms. Understanding which nationally unbound factors 
and how affect migrant claims making necessitates a more through investigation of 
factors underlying both globalization and internationalization.  
        According to Tarrow (2005) even though globalization is a source of claims and a 
frame for mobilizations, it is internationalism and particularly the complex form of  
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internationalism that provides opportunities for activism. If globalization consists of 
increased flows of trade, finance and people across borders, internationalism provides 
an opportunity structure within which transnational and local activism can emerge. 
Internationalization involves an increasing horizontal density of relations across states, 
governmental officials and non-state actors; increasing vertical links among the sub-
national, national and international levels and an enhanced formal and informal 
structure that invites transnational activism and facilitates the formation of networks of 
non-state, state and international actors. (Tarrow 2005) 
        I argue that these developments make it less and less helpful for us to employ the 
nation-state as our unit of analysis and lump the claims making of different 
communities together only because they reside or originate in a specific nation state.         
Therefore, the central role of the nation state should not be taken a priori but should be 
open to empirical analysis. Moreover, understanding the role of internationalization 
and globalization in affecting migrant claims making necessitates an understanding of 
mechanisms linking the changes brought by internationalization and globalization to 
migrant activism.   
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Factors influencing migrant claims making.  
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       I will try to accomplish these tasks by studying migrant claims making as an 
episode of contention where certain dynamic mechanisms produce mobilization as a 
result of their interaction. Below I present a dynamic analysis of migrant claims 
making where political opportunity structures and certain developments in the host 
and home countries, collective identities of the migrant group and changes brought by 
internationalization and globalization interact through certain mechanisms (attribution 
of threat and opportunity, internalization) to create certain mobilization outcomes. The 
diagram below (Diagram 2) displays the main factors affecting migrant claims 
making. The dynamic analysis of migrant claims making through mechanisms will 
explain what happens within these arrows and the nature of the resulting mobilization; 
therefore, explaining “how” and “why” certain types of mobilization (in this case 
claims) emerge. 
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CHAPTER 2  
WHY STUDY MILLI GORUS GERMANY? 
         Milli Gorus Germany, with 87,000 members and perhaps another 300,000 
sympathizers is and has always been one of the most controversial migrant 
organizations in Germany
3. It is the biggest Turkish and the biggest Islamic 
organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state.
4 I argue that 
understanding the nature of and the factors affecting Milli Gorus Germany claims 
making will not only help us understand Turkish Islamic claims making in Germany, 
but will also enhance our understanding of migrant claims making in general. 
         The name Milli Gorus refers to the Islamic political ideology created by 
Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey during the 1970s, aiming to win back for Islam the 
central role it played before it was pushed into the private sphere through the reforms 
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Milli Gorus literally translates as “National View”. 
However, the “national” in the “National View” refers to the Islamic nation made up 
of believers who believe in Allah as the one and only god. (IGMG Perspective, May 
2001) Today, Milli Gorus leaders in Germany prefer to use the abbreviation IGMG 
(Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus) instead of the name Milli Gorus and define 
their aim as defending the rights of Germany's Muslim population by giving them a 
                                                 
3 I chose Milli Gorus Germany as my case because it is the most vocal, the longest enduring and the 
biggest Turkish AND Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state. To 
be able to determine the biggest and the most vocal Turkish AND Islamic organization in Germany, I 
conducted interviews with members of Turkish immigrant organizations (regardless of their importance 
and size) in Baden Wuerttemberg and Hessen. Following up on information collected through these 
interviews, I conducted internet based research on organizations that were regularly mentioned in my 
interviews. My analysis showed that Milli Gorus is the most vocal, the longest enduring, the biggest and 
the most controversial Turkish and the most active, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most 
controversial Islamic organization in Germany which is not sponsored by the Turkish state 
 
4 DITIB (Turkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion e.V), the biggest Turkish organization in 
Germany, is a Turkish state sponsored institution functioning like the Diyanet Isleri (Department of 
Religious Affairs) in Turkey, regulating the religious affairs of the Turkish population in Germany. It 
functions like an official state institution, adheres to the official state view of Islam and works with 
imams sent by the Turkish government. (Jessen, 2006)  
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voice in the democratic political arena while at the same time preserving their Islamic 
identity. As I will show below, in recent years, IGMG has publicly rejected Erbakan’s 
anti-Semitic and Islamist statements, but according to some scholars, continues to 
adhere to the ideology of Milli Gorus Turkey. 
      Schiffauer (2004) defines Milli Gorus Germany as a transnational guest-worker 
organization whose complex nature has been shaped by its relationships with the 
German society, its home country (Turkey) and the Turkish immigrant population in 
Germany. Its roots can be traced to multiple migrant organizations which were 
established in Germany in the early 1970s, to provide prayer locations to Turkish 
immigrants. One of the most important characteristics of these small-scale 
organizations was their complete isolation from their German surroundings. For these 
organizations and their members, Germany was “gurbet”, a foreign land, which didn’t 
deserve attention and which didn’t pay attention to their needs. This attitude against 
Germany, which was later transferred to Milli Gorus Germany, contributed to the 
strong Turkey dependency and the belief in the eventual return to the mother country 
among these organizations. 
         Under these circumstances, many organizations practically became the outposts 
of certain villages or regions in Turkey and a very strong religiosity, even stronger 
than among their counterparts in Turkey, developed among these immigrants. Some 
influential members of these migrant organizations had, even before the migration, 
religious or ideological ties to certain religious or ideological groups in Turkey. These 
members made sure that the immigrant associations in Germany built strong structural 
connections to certain religious or ideological groups in Turkey, Milli Gorus being one 
of them.   
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        The origins of the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey can be traced to the 
Naqshbandi
5 leader of one of the most influential religious groups in Turkey, the 
Iskenderpasa congregation, Mehmet Zahid Kotku, who enabled Necmettin Erbakan to 
be elected as an MP from Konya in 1969 and who decided to build a political party out 
of this influential religious group. (Yavuz, 2005) After the short lived National Order 
Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was 
founded in 1972 and participated in multiple coalitions between 1972 and 1978. The 
Milli Gorus movement and its representative party advocated an Islamic version of 
Third Worldism which saw Turkey’s progress in its cultural and spiritual roots in the 
Ottoman-Islamic tradition and in the establishment of an autonomous heavy industry. 
        For many immigrants who blamed the economic strategies of the Turkish elite for 
their presence in Germany, Milli Gorus ideology was very attractive with its economic 
promises and its anti-Western discourse. This interest contributed to the double- 
natured development of Milli Gorus: A party in Turkey AND religious associations in 
Germany. In those early years, ministers from the party in Turkey made fundraising 
trips to Germany and the first president of the associations were designated by 
Erbakan. However, the connections between the party in Turkey and the associations 
in Germany and the ties of the German associations with each other were not as rigid 
as they would later become in the 1980s.  
            The second half of the 1970s saw a civil-war-like conflict in Turkish 
universities between the left and the right from which Milli Gorus tried to distance 
itself. However, it still felt itself closer to the right wing due to the belief that the 
Turkish socialists’, social democrats’ and communists’ links with important German 
state institutions contributed to the anti-Islam sentiment in Germany. Due to this 
belief, the outside connections of German Milli Gorus associations in these early years 
                                                 
5 Nakshbandi is one of the major Sufi orders of Islam.   
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couldn’t escape to be organized along the contours of the left-right conflict prevalent 
in Turkey.  
        1979 and 1980 were important years for Milli Gorus. 1979 saw the revolution in 
Iran and 1980, the occupation of Afghanistan and the military coup in Turkey. On the 
one hand, the Islamic development in Turkey seemed to have come to an end with the 
closure of the party and the imprisonment of Erbakan, but on the other hand the global 
Islamic movement was in full swing with the revolution in Iran. These were the times 
when an orientation towards the universal Islamic umma developed and when Milli 
Gorus started taking part in Islamic world politics.  
           The departure of Cemalletin Kaplan, an extremist preacher within the 
movement, with his many supporters in 1983 caused big troubles for Milli Gorus in 
Germany. After Kaplan’s departure, the party in Turkey took the initiative to organize 
the reconstruction of Milli Gorus Germany, connecting the small mosque associations 
to the center in Cologne and the center in Cologne, to the center in Turkey. The 
loosely connected mosque associations of the 1970s were now connected to a single 
center in Germany which was connected to the center in Turkey. Despite all this 
binding, the local mosque associations still maintained a certain amount of autonomy 
from the center in Cologne and the center in Cologne still preserved a certain amount 
of independence from Erbakan’s rule.  
          The more the center in Germany started taking part in the administration of local 
mosques all over Germany in the 1980s, the more Milli Gorus Germany acquired the 
characteristics of a religious association, differing substantially from the political party 
in Turkey. As the left-right conflict started to lose its relevance, the 1980s also saw an  
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increase in intra-Islamic differentiation within Germany with the departure of 
Cemaleddin Kaplan and the arrival of DITIB (Directorate of Religious Affairs)
6.  
            In 1990s, the belief in the eventual establishment of the “JUST ORDER”
7 in 
Turkey which promised immigrants a chance to return to Turkey with Turkey’s 
eventual industrialization by Islamic entrepreneurs, left its mark on Milli Gorus 
Germany. Therefore; when the Islamic holdings in Turkey went bankrupt in 2000 
taking many immigrants’ investments with them, the belief in the eventual return to 
the homeland was weakened significantly. This had a big boosting effect on the 
positive orientation of Milli Gorus Germany towards the host country. (Schiffauer, 
2004) 
             The orientation towards Germany was consolidated with the demographic 
change within the organization through which the second generation seeing Germany 
as their home came to power. It was at this moment in Milli Gorus Germany history 
that September 11 changed the opportunity structure for the organization completely. 
The changes brought by September 11 made sure that nothing and no one in the 
organization went unnoticed by German authorities, further weakening the hold of the 
conservatives within the organization and consolidating Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, Oguz 
Ucuncu and Mustafa Yeneroglu’s Troika.       
          Unfortunately, the reform politics of the second generation was not well 
received by the German public or the state. Milli Gorus Germany is still at the 
forefront of the discussions on migrant integration and Islam in Germany. German 
Bundesverfassungsschutz (Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) Germany's 
domestic intelligence agency, has repeatedly warned about Milli Gorus's activities, 
                                                 
6 DITIB (Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birligi) is an organization established by the Turkish state for the 
religious needs of Turkish immigrants in Germany. It represents the state sponsored version of Islam in 
Turkey and employs imams sent from Turkey. 
7 Adil Duzen (Just Order) is the name of Milli Gorus Turkey’s program which aims to bring a just order 
to Turkey based on autonomous industrialization and Islamic tradition and identity.   
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describing the group in its annual reports as a "foreign extremist organization." The 
reports also emphasize that “The IGMG and several other Islamist groups also try to 
establish a society based on the Quran and the Sharia for their sympathizers in 
Germany”. (Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2004) Responding to these criticisms, IGMG 
leaders have stressed their wish to live in a multicultural society, and have argued that 
their goal of retaining cultural distinctiveness and a Muslim way of life does not 
violate the German constitution or German laws. Members of IGMG do accept that 
they seek to follow the Quran and Sharia but emphasize that they do this within the 
confines of the democratic order in Germany. 
            Despite these pro-democracy and pro-German constitution statements from 
Milli Gorus members, and its recent attempts to open up its doors to the German 
public, the Bundesverfassungsschutz continues to argue that while in recent times 
Milli Görüş has increasingly emphasized the readiness of its members to be integrated 
into German society and asserted its adherence to German basic law, such statements 
stem from tactical calculation rather than from any inner change. Repeated statements 
by IGMG that they do adhere to the democratic order are at least implicitly dismissed 
by Verfassungsschutz reports. The agency claims that "although Milli Görüş, in public 
statements, pretends to adhere to the basic principles of Western democracies, 
abolition of the secular government system in Turkey and the establishment of an 
Islamic state and social system are, as before, among its goals.” 
(Verfassungsschutzbericht, 2004) 
           With its controversial stance, IGMG is not only active in Germany with 323 
mosque associations but also has 514 mosque associations throughout Europe. The 
organizational structure of IGMG consists of both centralized and 
decentralized/federative elements. Mosque associations make up the smallest unit of 
IGMG. These small mosque associations respond to the regional associations of  
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IGMG.  IGMG has regional associations in three countries: France, Belgium and 
Germany. Mosque associations in Norway, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Italy and Great Britain are advised and overseen by the 
regional associations in these three countries. The regional level associations 
constitute the link between the mosque associations and the center in Cologne. The 
center in Cologne prepares yearly work plans, organization strategies and provides the 
coordination between regional associations. It also takes part in organizing large scale 
social undertakings like the yearly gatherings, the pilgrimages, etc. The organization 
uses its monthly magazine (Perspektive), its website (www.igmg.de) and the daily 
newspaper Milli Gazete to spread its ideas to the public and its supporters. 
          I argue that understanding the nature of and the factors influencing the most 
vocal transnational Turkish AND Islamic immigrant organization’s, IGMG’ s, claims 
making will enhance our understanding of migrant claims making and the interaction 
of the national and transnational in shaping this claims making.             
          To this end, I studied Milli Gorus Germany claims by doing content analyses of 
this organizational media. (See more on this method in Methodological Appendix) 
This method gave me valuable information about the characteristics of Milli Gorus 
Germany claims making. To understand what shapes the nature of this claims making, 
I conducted 15 open-ended, 1 to 3 hour long interviews with high-ranking 
organization members in organization offices/mosques in Hessen, Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen.
8 These interviews and organizational 
documents also provided me information on Milli Gorus Germany’s external 
connections which helped me understand the nature of the relationship between Milli 
Gorus Turkey and Milli Gorus Germany  and the influence of this relationship on 
Milli Gorus Germany claims making.   
                                                 
8 To protect their privacy, the exact rank and name of the interviewee is kept secret.   
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CHAPER 3 
HOW SHOULD WE STUDY MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING? 
 
 THE STATE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON MIGRANT CLAIMS MAKING 
        Disproportional to the amount of theoretical debate on factors influencing 
migrant claims making, systematic empirical research continues to be rare. Post-
nationalist scholars try to bridge this gap between theoretical progress and empirical 
research by pointing to cases where migrants frame their claims in globally dominant 
discourses and appeal to non-nation state institutions to fight against national 
incursions on their rights. (Soysal, 1997) Their empirical research however, receives 
many criticisms, particularly concerning the representativeness of the cases they study. 
One of the harshest criticisms comes from Koopmans &Statham (1999) who argue 
that the post-nationalist empirical evidence remains unsystematic and often does not 
go much beyond the discussion of a few and supposedly representative examples.  
          Empirical evidence on the relevance and nature of claims for cultural group 
rights is also in scarce supply. Like empirical research by post-nationalist scholars, 
empirical research on claims for cultural rights is criticized for problems of 
representativeness. For example, Koopmans and Statham (1999) claim that the usual 
references to ethnic strife in Bosnia, Rwanda, or the former Soviet Union are quite 
irrelevant to the context of immigration in Western societies and examples drawn from 
more relevant contexts are usually anecdotal and extremely repetitive between studies. 
They argue that to what extent these examples are representative for the claims 
making of migrants and ethnic minorities in general, remains unclear.  
       Aiming to overcome the lack of systematic evidence and problems of 
representativeness, Koopmans and Statham (1999) conducted a cross-national 
empirical analysis of migrant claims making in Germany and Britain. They collected  
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data from daily newspapers in the two countries and conducted content analyses on 
every second issue (Monday, Wednesday, and Friday) of the Guardian for Britain and 
the Frankfurter Rundschau for Germany over a 6 year period between 1990 and 1995. 
               Koopmans and Statham (1999) included individual instances of claims 
making in the data set if it involved demands, criticisms, or proposals related to the 
regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration or xenophobia. Due to a 
special interest in minority claims making, they also recorded acts by resident ethnic 
minorities even if they were not related to these issues.  
             The results of Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) representative comparative 
analysis provide strong empirical evidence for the central role of the national 
citizenship model in explaining migrant activism. According to their findings, the 
nation state continues to be by far the most important frame of reference for the 
identities, organizations and claims of ethnic minorities, and national authorities 
remain the almost exclusive addressees of the demands of these minorities. They do 
find some migrant claims making, especially in Germany, that do transcend national 
borders, but this claims making occurs in ways that are not post-national. They simply 
take another nation state- the migrants’ homeland- as the frame of reference. Other 
than this, little evidence is found which would support the post-national argument; like 
migrants addressing supranational institutions, transnational migrant organizations 
intervening in national politics and minorities making demands on national 
governments in the name of international legal conventions and rights.  
            I argue that for the sake of being representative, Koopmans and Statham’s 
(1999) systematic empirical analysis overlooks many particularities of migrant claims 
making. In their analysis, they lump together all kinds of demands, criticisms, or 
proposals related to the regulation or evaluation of immigration, minority integration 
or xenophobia and all kinds of acts by different groups of resident ethnic minorities  
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between 1990 and 1995, overlooking any changes in claims making of particular 
groups over time and any essential differences in the nature of claims making among 
different immigrant groups. They also fail to recognize the possibility of media bias 
being the underlying cause of cross-national differences they find between Germany 
and Britain.  
             I don’t reject the value of cross-national representative comparative work on 
migrant claims making, but I encourage an approach where cross-national 
representative data are collected through the compilation of claims making data from 
different claims making groups in a specific country.  In the following section, by 
focusing on the only systemic cross-national empirical analysis on migrant claims 
making in Europe, I will first point to problems that might arise in a large scale cross-
national study and try to show that case study analyses of claims making immigrant 
organizations with a focus on the immigrant organizations’ media could provide us a 
better understanding of migrant claims making. I will then, present the answers such 
an approach provides to the question: “Is migrant claims making still created in the 
image of a particular nation state and if not, what shapes the nature of immigrant 
claims making?”   
 
INSIGHT LOST IN THE NAME OF REPRESENTATIVENESS: IS RELIGIOUS 
BASED MINORITY CLAIMS MAKING REALLY ABSENT IN GERMANY?  
             Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) first major finding in their representative 
cross-national analysis concerns the type of actors involved in minority claims 
making. Their data show that British minorities predominantly identify as racial or 
religious groups while their German counterparts identify on the basis of their 
homeland national or ethnic origin. The underlying reason for this focus on homeland 
national and ethnic identities is the exclusive German model of ethnic citizenship and  
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the labeling of migrants minorities by the state as foreigners. According to Koopmans 
and Statham (1999), this shows that mobilization of religious identities is not a general 
consequence of the presence of culturally different minorities but is dependant on a 
facilitating political context. Where such a facilitating context is lacking and 
immigrants are officially seen as citizens of another state, as in Germany, national 
origin and not religion becomes the overriding form in which migrants are identified 
and identify themselves.  
          In line with their theoretical expectations, apart from some claims making by 
Jewish groups, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find almost no claims making on a 
religious basis in Germany. As a researcher familiar with the controversial stance of 
Islamic migrant associations in Germany, I was intrigued to see 113 claims made by 
groups identified as Turks and only 3 claims by groups identified as Muslim/ Islamic 
in Koopmans and Statham’s results. Do minorities in Germany really identify on the 
basis of homeland identities only; for example as Turks or Kurds?  Are claims made 
by religiously identifying minority groups really absent in Germany with its 
approximately 2.6 million Muslims, who make up the 3.2% of the population? Is it 
minority associations who predominantly identify on the basis of their homeland 
national or ethnic origins or is it the media which display a selection bias by only 
reporting claims made by groups identifying on the basis of homeland national or 
ethnic origins? 
           If it’s really the migrants identifying predominantly on the basis of homeland 
identities and an unbiased mainstream media reporting it, one would be able to find a 
similar or at least a comparable number of claims actually made by a religiously 
identifying minority organization (i.e. an Islamic organization) and published in the 
mainstream media. To be able to test this hypothesis, I focus on the most vocal 
Turkish Islamic immigrant organization in Germany, IGMG, and compare the number  
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of claims actually made by it and published by the mainstream media. I focus on an 
Islamic organization to challenge the finding that religious based minority claims 
making is absent in Germany and I focus on the most vocal Islamic organization to 
decrease the likelihood that the mainstream media overlook claims made by this 
organization.
9 
            No one can prove if IGMG is genuine in its adherence to democracy and the 
German basic law or not, but with its controversial stance and its contentious claims 
making, it definitely is unlikely to be absent from the arena of public claims making in 
Germany. Due to its controversial nature, one expects to come across many claims by 
Milli Gorus in Germany. However, according to Koopmans&Statham’ s (1999) 
findings there were only 3 claims made by Muslim/Islamic religious organizations 
between 1990 and 1995 in Germany. 
            Is religious claims making really absent in Germany? Does the problem lie in 
the selection of a particular newspaper “Frankfurter Rundschau” as the source 
newspaper among many mainstream newspapers? Or do the German media exhibit a 
bias against claims making that contradicts an identification of Germany’s non-
German residents as citizens of another state who only make claims based on their 
homeland based identities?  
 
B. 1: IS FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU THE PROBLEM?    
            To be able to answer these questions on media bias, I searched for and 
recorded claims made by Milli Gorus in mainstream (non-immigrant) German media 
                                                 
9 To be able to determine the biggest and the most vocal Islamic organization in Germany, I conducted interviews 
with members of Turkish immigrant organizations (regardless of their importance and size) in Baden 
Wuerttemberg and Hessen. Following up on information collected through these interviews I conducted internet 
based research on organizations that were regularly mentioned in my interviews. My analysis showed that Milli 
Gorus is the most vocal, the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Turkish and the most active, 
the longest enduring, the biggest and the most controversial Islamic organization in Germany which is not 
sponsored by the Turkish state.  
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through Lexis Nexis by using Koopmans and Statham’s method of data collection.
10 
Lexis Nexis provides access to several important mainstream German newspapers and 
magazines including, Associated Press World Stream (starting from April 1995), 
Berliner Morgenpost (since 1999), Der Spiegel (since 1999), Focus Magazine (since 
1993), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (since 1993), General-Anzeiger (since 2000), 
Stern (since 1998), Stuttgarter Nachrichten (since 2004), Stuttgarter Zeitung (since 
2003), Süddeutsche Zeitung (since 1991), Die Tageszeitung (since 1994), and Die 
Welt (since 2003). 
           Even though Lexis Nexis does provide access to Sueddeutsche Zeitung
11, 
which is one of the finest newspapers in Germany with an encompassing national and 
international focus, beginning as early as 1991, a search between 1990 and 1995 that 
uses certain keywords related to Milli Gorus (Milli Gorus, AMGT, IGMG, relevant 
high ranking Milli Gorus member names) gives only a single claim by Milli Gorus in 
1995 which a host country claim.
12  
        Claims made by Milli Gorus are virtually absent in German mainstream media 
between 1991 and 1995. These results show that the finding (only 3 religious based 
claims) by Koopmans and Statham (1999) that religious based claims making is absent 
in Germany, is not only valid for a single newspaper (Frankfurter Rundschau). Milli 
                                                 
10 Acts by Milli Gorus Germany are considered to be claims and therefore are included in the data if 
they involve demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind. 
11 Lexis Nexis doesn’t provide access to any German language newspaper before 1991, therefore I don’t 
have any data on year 1990 to compare to Koopmans and Statham (1999)’s findings. However; 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung which is one of the finest newspapers in Germany, is available through Lexis 
Nexis beginning with 1991. My findings in 1991 and 1992 are single-handedly based on Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung and could reflect a selection bias against Milli Gorus claims by this particular newspaper. 
However; my findings (see below) show that even if there is a selection bias, it is representative of the 
general trend in the German media and therefore should not change the direction of my arguments. 
12 I categorized Milli Gorus claims according to what the claim was related to. I used three categories: 
“host”, “home” and “supra/transnational”. If the claim is about Germany, it was coded as “host”. If the 
claim was about Turkey, it was coded as “home” and if the claim concerned an issue outside these two 
countries, it was coded as “supra/transnational”. To be specific, the category “supra/transnational” 
includes claims related to the situation of Muslims/Islam in the world, any claim concerning a country 
other than Turkey or Germany, any claims about the situation of the humanity/world in general and any 
claims about a supra/transnational institution.  
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Gorus claims; claims of the most controversial and active religious based migrant 
organization in Germany, are absent not only in Frankfurter Rundschau but in all 
mainstream German media between 1991 and 1995. 
B.2: MAINSTREAM MEDIA BIAS OR MIGRANTS NOT IDENTIFYING ON THE 
BASIS OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES? 
 
        Koopmans and Statham (1999) recognize but downplay the problem of a 
probable selection bias in the mainstream media. They argue that since their interest is 
in publicly visible claims making, the problem of selection bias is less aggravating 
than in other contexts because acts of claims making become relevant and potentially 
controversial only when they reach the public sphere. However, their research 
question is not about the relevancy or the controversial nature of migrant claims 
making. Their research question concerns the quantity and types of claims migrants 
make, the frames they use, the institutions they direct their claims to and the identities 
they adopt. Therefore, if one finds no religious based or supranational claims 
addressed to supranational institutions using supranational frames due to a media bias, 
the conclusions drawn from these findings stressing the role of the ubiquitous nation 
state in affecting migrant claims making also become problematic.    
           By focusing on the claims of the most contentious Islamic AND Turkish 
association in Germany which is most likely to be present in the German mainstream 
media with its claims, my next findings are going to show that religious migrant 
associations, particularly Islamic ones, do make claims and try to reach the 
mainstream public sphere with their claims but are unfortunately left out by the 
German media.  
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           In search for claims by Milli Gorus, I adopted Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) 
content analysis method to record demands, criticisms and proposals by Milli Gorus.
13 
Unlike Koopmans and Statham, I searched for these claims not in mainstream German 
media but in the target organization’s own bilingual media. Content analyses of Milli 
Gorus’s own newspaper which is published and distributed in Germany (Milli Gazete), 
their monthly magazine (Perspektive) and the organization website (www.igmg.de) 
showed me that I wasn’t wrong about the contentious nature of Milli Gorus. My 
analysis starts with the official founding date of IGMG (1985) and ends at the end of 
2005. However, I first focus on the period between 1990 and 1995 to compare my 
findings with Koopmans and Statham’s and then see if my findings remain to be 
relevant for the period between1995 and 2005.    
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Figure 3: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (In 
organizational media) 
 
         Contrary to Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) finding that religious based claims 
making is absent in Germany, as seen in graph 1, with 270 claims, Milli Gorus is by 
no means absent from claims making in Germany between 1990 and 1995. Even if we 
                                                 
13 Acts by Milli Gorus Germany are considered to be claims and therefore are included in the data if 
they involve demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind.  
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consider all of the 3 claims made by Muslim associations in Frankurter Rundschau to 
be Milli Gorus claims, the discrepancy still remains to be enormous. Not even one 
third of Milli Gorus claims have been published by the mainstream German media in 
general, or by Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) focus newspaper in particular.           
        My finding not only contradicts Koopmans and Stathams’s (1999) results on the 
number of religious based claims making in Germany but also contradicts their finding 
on claims making by European level migrant organizations. Koopmans and Statham 
(1999) find no claims by such organizations at all in Britain and just two cases with 
PKK and the Iranian People’s Mujahedin being the cases in Germany. For them, this 
finding confirms the view that migrant organizations on the European level have 
remained relatively impotent actors mainly because migrant groups from different 
European countries have widely diverging opinions about the aims and strategies of 
integration and antiracism. However, I argue that with 270 claims, Milli Gorus as an 
organization active in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, 
England, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, would definitely change the direction of 
Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) findings on the absence/presence of European level 
migrant organizations. 
          Not only is there a huge discrepancy between the number of claims made by 
Milli Gorus and published in the German media, there is also discrepancy in the types 
of claims made by Milli Gorus and actually published by the media. According to 
Koopmans and Statham (1999), the most important field of claims making for German 
minorities between 1990 and 1995 refers to the political situation in migrants’ 
homelands. My findings on Milli Gorus claims making reveals that claims related to 
the migrants’ homeland is never the most important field of claims making in this 
period. To the contrary as seen in Graph 1, in all 6 years except in 1990, homeland 
based claims make up the smallest category. Surprisingly, it is claims related to  
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supra/transnational issues that make up the most important category of claims between 
1992 and 1995, and it is host country related claims making that take the center stage 
in 1990 and 1991. Therefore, one can in no way claim that Milli Gorus acts according 
to the way the German national citizenship model would lead us to expect. 
          In terms of the authorities and institutions that claims were directed to, 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) find that the nation state (the German state) is the 
target of 73% of claims making in Germany. In my data on Milli Gorus, this is hardly 
the case. While Koopmans and Statham (1999) find that only 1% of these claims were 
addressed to supranational authorities, in my data supra/transnational addressees make 
up the largest group of addressees except for 2 years (1990 and 1995) where the host 
or the home nation state were the addressee of claims.
14 (See Graph 2)  
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Figure 4: Addressees of IGMG claims in organizational media. 
          Finally, Koopmans and Statham (1999) ask to what extent these claims are 
framed with reference to supranational, transnational or national institutions, rights 
and conventions. They find that as much as 99 percent of claims in Germany are 
                                                 
14 In my content analysis, I also documented the addressees of MG claims, categorizing these 
addressees into four groups: “Home”, “host”, “supra/transnational” and “foreign country”. “Home” and 
“host” categories refer to claims addressed to Turkey and Germany, respectively. The category 
“supra/transnational” refers to claims addressed to supra or transnational institutions like the UN and 
the EU, or designations like “westerners”, “Muslims”, etc. The “foreign state” category involves states 
other than Turkey and Germany as addressees.   
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firmly locked within a national frame of reference. My findings suggest that 
supra/transnational frames and “human rights” frames have been utilized by Milli 
Gorus extensively between 1990 and 1995. They have become so common that they 
together make up the biggest category of claims making in all years between 1990 and 
1995. (See Graph 3)  
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Figure 5: Frames used in Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1990 and 1995. (in 
organizational media)  
 
B.3. Does the Media Bias Continue? 
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Figure 6: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims recorded in the mainstream German 
media. 
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Figure 7: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In 
organizational media) 
          Unfortunately, this media bias is not confined to the period between 1990 and 
1995.  A comparison between the numbers of Milli Gorus claims recorded by 
mainstream German media (Graph 4) and actually made by Milli Gorus (Graph 5) 
between 1985 and 2005 shows that except for 2004 and 2005 there has been a real 
discrepancy in the number of claims made by Milli Gorus and actually published by 
the German mainstream media.  
           In terms of the discrepancy in the types of claims published in the mainstream 
media and actually made by Milli Gorus, a comparison of the type of Milli Gorus 
claims published in mainstream German media and in Milli Gorus’s own media shows 
that the German media fail to publish Milli Gorus claims related to supra/transnational 
issues till 2001 and records these types of claims in significantly less amounts after 
2001. (Table ….)The only year that the German media come close to publishing the 
supra/transnational Milli Gorus claims, is 2004. It remains to be seen if 2004 stays as 
an outlier or if the German media becomes more representative in publishing the types 
of claims Milli Gorus makes. 
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Table 1: Numbers of supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims in 
organizational and German mainstream media.  
 
 
               In the German media, not only is there a selection bias against claims related 
to supra/transnational issues, but as table 2 shows that frames using references to 
supranational ideologies and rights (e.g. human rights) don’t get published in the 
German media. However, for types of frames published, the German media seem to 
have become more representative beginning in 2004 and 2005, but again it remains to 
be seen if this is going to be a permanent trend. 
 
Table 2: Supra/transnational and human rights frames of Milli Gorus Germany claims 
in organizational and German mainstream media.  
 
 
   
     Unfortunately, the same positive development can not be observed in the types of 
addressees published by the German media. In this category, the emphasis in the 
German media continues to be single-handedly on host country institutions while in 
reality Milli Gorus does address many supra/transnational institutions and foreign 
states. (Table 3) These results show that the German media not only records a 
Supra/transnational+ 
human rights frames in:
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m e d i a 1 81 33 23 62 43 64 61 61 94 12 6
German mainstream 
media
0003005119 1 3
Supra/transnational 
claims in:
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m e d i a2 63 32 42 81 84 64 41 93 42 42 5
German mainstream 
media
001100621 1 87 
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significantly lower number of claims by Milli Gorus but they also record a 
significantly lower number of supra/transnational claims, frames and addressees.  
 
Table 3: Supranational and foreign state addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims in 
organizational and German mainstream media.  
 
        An analysis of Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) focus newspaper (Frankfurter 
Rundschau) between 2003 and 2005, in search for claims by Milli Gorus also shows 
that this selection bias endures. A search for Milli Gorus claims only returns one 
homeland related claim in 2003, 5 homeland related claims in 2004 and 1 homeland 
and 1 supra/transnational related claim in 2005. Not only are Milli Gorus’s claims on 
host country issues and supra/transnational issues are ignored, supranational frames 
and addresses are not take not taken notice of, with 7 host country addresses and 4 
host country frames but no supranational frames or addressees published by 
Frankfurter Rundschau. 
         These findings make Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) conclusions stressing the 
lack of transnational migrant organizations making claims on nation states, migrant 
organizations addressing supranational organizations/institutions and framing their 
claims by referring to international rights and conventions, at least questionable. Even 
if Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) data is reliable and representative, putting claims 
from different organizations over a long period of time together makes researchers 
overlook important differences in the nature of claims making between different 
groups and the non-nation state bound factors leading to these differences. I argue that 
understanding migrant claims making necessitates individual case study analyses of 
Supranational +foreign state 
addressees in:
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  m e d i a 1 51 41 32 41 71 83 41 13 21 41 6
G e r m a n  m a i n s t r e a m  m e d i a 0 0110062112 
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migrant organizations over a period of time and a focus on organization documents 
and media for these analyses.  
             As seen above, relying on mainstream media to retrieve data on migrant 
claims making can, first, lead to the exclusion of very important players from our 
analysis and this exclusion can distort our findings. Second, combining claims made 
by different organizations over a long period of time runs the risk of failing to see 
changes over time in claims making of a particular organization and differences in the 
claims making strategies of different groups, preventing us from understanding the 
mechanisms and processes leading to particular claims making strategies for different 
types of groups. Below, I first present a descriptive analysis of Milli Gorus claims 
making between 1985 and 2005 and then discuss the mechanisms that have shaped the 
nature of Milli Gorus claims making. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MILLI GORUS CLAIMS MAKING 
BETWEEN 1985 AND 2005 
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Figure 8: Type of Milli Gorus Germany claims making between 1985 and 2005. (In 
organizational media) 
 
       In Graph 6, Milli Gorus claims have been categorized depending on whether they 
are related to the host country (in this case Germany), the home country (in this case 
Turkey) or transnational/supranational issues. My findings are quite surprising for an 
organization that Koopmans and Statham (1999) would expect to behave according to 
the parameters of the national citizenship model in Germany. 
       For example, Koopmans and Statham (1999) theorize that in line with the national 
citizenship model, the most important field of claims making for German minorities 
should refer to the political situation in migrants’ homelands. Contrary to Koopmans 
and Statham’s (1999) expectations, we see that claims making referring to migrants’ 
homeland make up the lowest category in most of the years. The only relevant 
exception where Koopmans and Statham’s hypothesis comes true is the year 1987 
where 15 homeland related claims were made. In line with theories on  
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supranationalism, emphasizing migrant associations making claims on 
supra/transnational issues,  in 12 out of 21 years, Milli Gorus claims referring to supra 
or transnational issues make up the most numerous category of claims. 
         In addition to the high amount of supra/transnational claims, Milli Gorus claims 
concerned with some aspect of the host country make up the most numerous category 
in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1997, 1999 and 2004. This shows that even if supranationalism is 
prevalent in Milli Gorus claims making, host country related claims continue to be 
essential in certain periods, contrary to Koopmans and Statham’s (1999) claims that 
German minorities are preoccupied with the politics of their homelands due to the 
influence of the particular national citizenship regime in Germany. 
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Figure 9: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In 
organizational media) 
 
          Another form in which migrant transnationalism takes place is when collective 
actors, whether themselves transnational or not, bypass national authorities and 
directly address institutions and authorities outside the nation state. In contrast, the 
national citizenship model leads us to expect political authorities within the national 
polity to be the most important addressees of claims. In addition to the hypotheses  
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above, in Germany, the national citizenship model leads us to expect a significant 
number of claims addressed at the authorities of migrants’ homelands. 
           In line with the national citizenship model, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find 
that the nation state is the target of 73 percent of claims making in Germany and the 
only significant form of claims making transcending national borders are claims 
addressed at the governments of migrants’ homelands. Moreover, such cases are not of 
the type asking homeland governments to intervene with the German government on 
behalf of migrant rights which would still fit the post-national model. Almost 
exclusively they are all related to political conflicts in the homeland.  
       Koopmans and Statham (1999) do come across several examples of claims 
making that would support the supranational thesis. For example in 1994 a group of 
200 German Kurds drove to French Strasbourg to offer a petition to the European 
parliament against the persecution of Kurds in Turkey. In another example, German 
Roma and Sinti groups appealed to the UNHRC to move against the German 
government’s plan to deport refugees from this ethnic group back to Romania. 
However, Koopmans and Statham (1999) find little else and these examples are highly 
exceptional. It remains a mystery as to how their results would change if Milli Gorus’s 
120 supra/transnational addressees were recorded.            
           As seen in the graph 7, supra/transnational addressees are by no means absent 
in Milli Gorus claims making. To the contrary, in years 1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 
1994, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003 (11 out of 21 years), when combined together 
supra/transnational and foreign state category have the highest number of entries. 1987 
and 1995 are years where the home country (Turkey) was addressed the most and 
1990, 1996, 1997, 2002, and 2004 are years when authorities in Germany were 
addressed more than any other category. These results show that addressees of Milli  
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Gorus claims are not overwhelmed by a single handed emphasis on a single type of 
addressee but change in ways that need to be explained. 
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Figure 10: Frames used by Milli Gorus Germany between 1985 and 2005. (In 
organizational media) 
 
       Another important aspect of migrant activism emphasized by postnationalists is 
claims being framed with reference to supranational and transnational institutions, 
rights, ideas, norms and conventions. In turn, references to multiculturalism in frames 
are important for the multicultural citizenship thesis which sees demands for special 
group rights related to the recognition and protection of cultural differences-cultural 
rights- as a central characteristic of minority claims making.  
        Not surprisingly, Koopmans and Statham find little support for the postnational 
and multiculturalist theories with 99% of claims made in Germany being firmly 
locked within a national frame. Even though they find little evidence for the types of 
claims making claimed to be typical for the modern migrant experience by the 
postnational or multiculturalist scholars, my research shows otherwise. As seen in 
graph 8, Milli Gorus makes references to supra/transnational institutions, norms, 
conventions and rights continuously and overwhelmingly and homeland related frames  
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stay as the lowest category throughout the years. However, this overwhelming use of 
supranational frames by Milli Gorus should not lead us to start celebrating migrant 
transnationalism before we analyze changes in the use of supranational claims and 
understand the factors leading to this supranationalism. This finding should also not 
prevent us from studying the changes in the nature of host country frames throughout 
the years in response to factors that need to be specified.     
        I argue that even though my results are not representative, the 82 
supra/transnational, human rights or multiculturalism related frames used by Milli 
Gorus would at least remove the “few” in the “Few examples of claims making 
beyond national boundaries exist”.  Even though I have not examined claims making 
by all minority groups in Germany like Koopmans and Statham (1999) have, the 
complete absence of the biggest, most vocal, controversial and longest enduring 
Turkish Islamic organization’s claims from the mainstream German media is one of 
the main factors that have made Koopmans and Statham’s results deceiving. I argue 
that it’s not German minorities who conform to Germany’s view of them as citizens of 
another state, but it’s the German media which overwhelmingly record claims that 
conform to the standards set by Germany’s national citizenship model. Germany sees 
immigrants as foreigners but that is not always, as we see in the case of Milli Gorus, 
the way in which minorities behave.  They don’t always organize and identify 
themselves on the basis of their national origin and are not, always, preoccupied with 
the politics of their homeland. This is exactly why, migrant claims making should not 
be studied as the outcome of a single static variable but should be studied as an 
outcome of multiple home/host country, extra nation state and within group factors 
that work together through certain mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER 5 
MECHANISMS EXPLAINING THE “HOW” OF MIGRANT CLAIMS 
MAKING& SUPPORTING EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
AN ACTIVATING MECHANISM: ATTRIBUTION OF THREAT AND 
OPPORTUNITY 
                  The much criticized “political opportunity structure” is essential to the 
classical social movement paradigm. This paradigm focuses on consistent dimensions 
of the political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using 
collective action. (Tarrow: 1998) The opening up of institutional access, shifts in 
political alignment, the presence or absence of influential allies and the prospect of 
repression or facilitation have been among variables used by the social movement 
paradigm in successfully explaining social movement mobilization. However, as 
Tarrow (2005) points out, the social movement paradigm exhibits three major 
problems: a single minded focus on single-actor movements, an indifference to the 
broader field of contentious politics, a focus on static variables and a single handed 
focus on movements at the domestic level.  
         Trying to reform the paradigm they themselves took part in creating; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2001) aim to identify dynamic mechanisms that bring the variables 
of the classical social movement paradigm into relations with one another and with 
other significant actors, as a result putting each of the constituent parts of the classical 
agenda into motion. In this new dynamic and interactive framework, the first impulse 
for an episode of contention comes from “broad change processes”. These broad 
change processes can come from within a nation state (both host and home) or could 
be supranational, transnational or international. They ignite other sets of mechanisms 
which interact and culminate in a contentious episode and create collective action.  
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            Rather than looking at “opportunities and threats” as objective structural 
factors, I see them as subject to attribution and like McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) 
believe that threats and opportunities cannot automatically be read from objective 
structural changes. No opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization 
unless it is visible to potential challengers and is perceived as an opportunity. The 
same holds for threats. Therefore, attribution of opportunity or threat should be studied 
as an activating mechanism igniting contentious claims making.  
           Attribution of opportunity or threat as a mechanism is however, dependant on 
certain characteristics of contentious groups. As Koopmans and Statham (2001) who 
include collective identities of migrant groups as the third component of the triad of 
determinants of migrant claims making and like Kuru (1995), I attribute a central role 
to collective identities and ideologies of groups. I argue that migrant groups’ 
belonging in a specific ethnic group, their religious and racial identification, and of 
course their degree of attachment to the country of origin are factors affecting the 
“attribution of opportunity or threat”. In the case of Milli Gorus which claims to be an 
organization defending the basic rights of Muslims, certain change processes are more 
likely to induce mobilization than a secular Kemalist Turkish immigrant organization 
like the AADD (Ataturkist Thought Association). As a comparison of claims making 
of AADD and Milli Gorus in Germany between 2000 and 2005 shows, while the war 
in Iraq has been a very contentious issue for Milli Gorus Germany, AADD has not 
even made a single claim about it even though it claims to strive for “Peace at home 
and peace at world.” (www.ataturk.de) A comparison of Milli Gorus Germany and 
staunchly secular AADD claims making show that adherence to a global Muslim 
identity based on common beliefs, rituals and social practices and to the common 
brotherhood of Muslims (the umma) makes issues like the position of Muslim 
minorities in Europe or the conflicts involving Muslims in Afghanistan, Palestine,  
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Bosnia Chechnya and elsewhere mobilization inducing for Milli Gorus Germany 
while these issues are not perceived as threats or opportunities by AADD. Moreover, 
as will be discussed below, changes in Milli Gorus Germany ideological/religious 
identification over the years explain why same types of issues induce mobilization at 
certain times and don’t at other times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: A dynamic framework for analyzing the initial stages of migrant claims 
making.  
 
           In support of my theoretical arguments, I first present changes in the nature of 
Milli Gorus claim making in Germany throughout the years focusing on the type (what 
issues these claims are made in reference to) of these claims since the mid-1980s. 
Even though Milli Gorus’s claims making in Germany before 1985 will not be studied 
systematically due to the informal nature of Milli Gorus Germany’s organizational 
structure and lack of any media reporting these claims, a history of Milli Gorus in 
Germany and political Islam in Turkey before 1985 need to be discussed. 
Developments after 1985 will be discussed within the theoretical analysis of Milli 
Gorus Germany claims making. 
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POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: MANY PARTIES, A SINGLE VOICE 
  
          Among Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s first moves as the leader of the new Republic 
of Turkey in the 1920s was the recasting of Islam. During this period Kemalist 
intellectuals sought to rearticulate a sort of humanistic-nationalistic Islam that would 
be compatible with Western Enlightenment values and cultural practices. Although the 
Kemalists ideologically advocated an Islam with no institutional mediation between 
God and the believer, and ordered the closing of Sharia courts and the Sufi 
brotherhoods, they did not simply eliminate all religious institutional structures. 
Rather, they replaced the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Affairs with Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) which was established as a branch of the new government. 
The Diyanet was and continues to be responsible for administering mosques and 
providing them with imams.  
         The Islamist movement emerged soon after the founding of the secular republic 
in 1923. It was led by tarikat (religious order) sheikhs and professional men of religion 
who had lost their status and economic power when secular reforms abolished 
religious institutions. However, this movement failed to gain widespread support and 
was crushed by the authorities throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In general, Islamist 
groups stayed underground during the era of the one-party rule between 1923 and 
1946.  
       With the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, Islamist groups formed covert 
and overt alliances with the ruling center right Democratic Party (1950-1960). Until 
Necmettin Erbakan established the National Order Party, Islamists either continued 
forming conservative factions in a center right party or remained underground. With 
the NOP (Milli Nizam Partisi), for the first time, the Islamists had an autonomous 
party organization through which they could campaign for their agenda. Since the  
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NOP’s founding, the same Islamist party has endured, but under different names: NOP 
(1970-1971), NSP (1972-1981), Welfare Party (1983-1998), Virtue Party (1997-
2001), Felicity Party (2001-current).   
        The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) was shut down by the 
Constitutional Court on May 20, 1971 due to military pressure on the grounds that it 
violated the principles of laicism laid down in the Constitution and in the Law of 
Political Parties. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan had to fell to Switzerland to escape 
persecution and stayed there till 1972. (Yavuz, 2005) Following NOP’s closure, the 
National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was founded in October 1972 to 
succeed the NOP. With support from provincial merchants, artisans and the covert 
network of two leading informally organized religious groups- the Nakshibandis and 
Nurcus, the NSP achieved a surprising electoral success in the 1973 general elections, 
obtaining 11.8 percent of the total vote.  
         These developments with Necmettin Erbakan in the center stage had also a 
transnational dimension because of the large flow of Turkish guest workers into 
Germany and other European countries beginning in the late 1960s. As a result of this 
labor immigration from Turkey to Western Europe, migrants with a rural background 
which had grown up in societies with high social control, found themselves in the 
anonymous big cities of Western Europe. Milli Gorus Germany came into being in the 
niches of big cities to provide for the needs of these Turkish immigrants with mainly 
rural backgrounds. It provided more than prayer locations; it provided a second home 
far away from home. For these immigrants, belonging to an organization meant a 
sense of security and meaning in life. (Schiffauer, 2004 )To these functions were later 
added a function of protecting the off-springs from becoming foreign. It was, of 
course, no surprise that Erbakan’s years of flight in Western Europe in the beginning 
of the 70s corresponded to the foundational years of Milli Gorus in Europe.  
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        In these early years, ties between the party in Turkey and the associations in 
Germany were loose. The head of the party in Turkey visited Germany a couple of 
times but the ties were never as strict as they later became in the 80s. Even if 
organizational ties were not that rigid, Milli Gorus in Germany followed the program 
of the party in Turkey and remained completely isolated from its German 
surroundings due mainly to the idea of an eventual return to the home country.    
         In the meantime, after its solid showing in the 1973 general elections, the NSP 
became a coalition partner in successive governments. First, it formed a government 
with the staunchly secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP) led by Bulent Ecevit. 
During the 1970s when the NSP took part in many government coalitions, it managed 
to place its members in the bureaucracy, particularly in the ministries that it controlled. 
It also succeeded in passing a bill that made theological high schools equal to 
secondary schools and enabled these schools’ often pro-Islamic students to attend 
universities. Many graduates of these schools have gone on to politics as Islamists in 
the 1980s and 1990s. (E.g. the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan) 
         In the late 1970s, as successive governments failed to solve the country’s serious 
economic and political problems the antagonism between the radical left and radical 
rights escalated into violent clashes bordering on civil war. In 1980, the armed forces 
led by General Kenan Evren, seized power in a coup and restructured the political 
system with a new military drafted constitution. The leading parties, including the 
NSP, were banned from political activity and many important movement members had 
to flee to Europe and mainly to Germany to escape from persecution.  
       1979 and 1980 were also change years in the Islamic world. 1979 saw the 
revolution in Iran and 1980 the invasion of Afghanistan. While in Turkey it looked 
like the Islamic movement had come to a halt, an Islamic revolution had succeeded in 
Iran. These were the years when an orientation towards umma started gaining a  
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stronghold within Milli Gorus. Milli Gorus started taking part in Islamic world politics 
and built strong network ties particularly with Afghan reactionaries in Afghanistan. 
15     
         Milli Gorus Germany claims making throughout the years manifests this 
orientation towards the universal Islamic community of umma and the aim of being 
involved in Islamic world politics.  For example, as seen in graph 9, 13 out of 15 
claims I recorded in 1985 fell into the category of supra/transnational. In particular, 
these claims were related to the situation in Afghanistan, calls for the unity of Islamic 
umma, the problems of Muslims in Bulgaria and Palestine. My data on Milli Gorus 
Germany claims making shows that this identification with the global Islamic 
community and an engagement in Islamic world politics have been continuously 
present till today with countless supra/transnational, home or host claims made in 
response to perceived threats and opportunities emerging due to the problems of 
Muslims in multiple places. (e.g. Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, etc)  
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Figure 12: Types of Milli Gorus Germany claims between 1985 and 2005. (In 
organizational media)  
The informal network of Milli Gorus in Germany experienced problems in 
1983, as the reestablishment of the party in Turkey was in process, when one of the 
                                                 
15 In these years, the organizational media documents many visits to Milli Gorus Germany offices by 
leaders of Afghan reactionaries.  
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most radical preachers of the organization, Cemaleddin Kaplan broke away from Milli 
Gorus taking numerous supporters, mosques and associations with him. Kaplan 
questioned the legitimacy of the leadership of Erbakan as an engineer and stressed his 
own legitimacy as a cleric. He emphasized a strategy based on victory through an 
Islamic revolution in contrast to parliamentarian means as preferred by Erbakan and 
his followers.  
        On July 19, 1983, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was formed under the 
leadership of Ali Turkmen instead of the politically banned Erbakan. (However, 
Erbakan was eventually reinstated into Turkish politics and became the Welfare 
Party’s leader.) One of the first things the leaders of the Welfare Party did was to take 
the initiative in Germany and send Sevki Yilmaz, a cleric and a charismatic speaker 
and Osman Yumakogullari a major player in Milli Gorus, to Germany to organize the 
reconstruction of Milli Gorus in Germany. 
               During the of reconstruction, the loosely organized Milli Gorus structure in 
Germany became strongly connected to the center in Ankara and at the top of this 
rigid organizational structure sat Necmettin Erbakan. A centralized organizational 
structure and a mostly anti-democratic organizational culture developed during these 
years. In 1985, all Milli Gorus associations in Germany became formally connected to 
the center in Cologne. The now centralized organization took the name AMGT 
(Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilatlari, National View Associations in Europe) which was 
later changed to IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus, Islamic Society of 
National View) in 1994.
16 Figure 13 depicts the historical development of Milli Gorus 
Germany. 
 
                                                 
16 AMGT is an abbreviation from the Turkish name “Avrupa Milli Gorus Teskilatlari”, but IGMG is an 
abbreviation from the German “Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Gorus”.  
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Figure 13:  The historical development of Milli Gorus Germany (IGMG)  
Source: Jesse, 2006 
 
       Beginning in 1983, the relationship between Milli Gorus associations in Germany 
and the party in Turkey became so intertwined that the success of either came to be 
dependent on the other. The associations were supported by the party in Turkey 
through competent preachers sent from Turkey and the associations financially 
supported the election campaign of the Refah Party. At the end, the success of the 
Welfare Party at the end of 80s and the beginning of 90s worked for the attractiveness 
of the associations in Germany. My analysis of Milli Gorus Germany documents this 
interconnectedness. It shows that leaders of the movement in Turkey were present not 
only during yearly meetings, but were present in Germany giving speeches, attending 
meetings, formal dinners and paying visits to Milli Gorus associations on a daily basis.  
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          In the meantime, a single handed orientation of Milli Gorus Germany towards 
Turkey due to the myth of return and the central role played by the first generation 
within the organization was starting to ease. While previously, host country related 
changes were not interpreted as threats or opportunities, the proposed foreigner’s law 
in Germany was appropriated as a “threat to the members of the Turkish community 
who intend to stay here permanently.” (Milli Gazete, October 30
th, 1989, March 9
th, 
1990)  Milli Gorus responded to this potential threat against their “basic human rights” 
(May 5
th, 1990) with active public protests in 1989 and 1990 as seen in increase in the 
number of host country related claims. (See graph 10) Another major host country 
related development in the beginning of the 90s was the rise in Neo-Nazi violence 
against foreigners and particularly Turks in Germany. In response to this, not only the 
Turkish state which was seen as the inherent protector of Turks in Germany but also 
the German authorities and institutions were called to action. Milli Gorus leaders 
threatened the host country authorities with democratic protests and a total withdrawal 
of the Turkish money from German banks unless proper precautions were taken. (Milli 
Gazete, June 11
th 1993)  
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Figure 14: Milli Gorus Germany host country related claims. (In organizational media)  
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        Even with a rise in interest in host country developments, interest in the Islamic 
umma was never lost. This interest became apparent during the war in Bosnia in 1992 
and 1993 when supra/transnational claims making more than quadrupled. Not only the 
content of claims making but also the addressees reveal an emphasis on the 
importance of supporting “Muslim brothers” all over the world. Between 1991 and 
1994, the addressees of Milli Gorus were overwhelmingly supra/transnational calling 
for supranational institutions, Muslim countries and other foreign states to action on 
the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and etc.  During these years, while an orientation 
towards the host country was taking root slowly, claims making on particularly 
Muslim related supranational issues never disappeared.  (See graph 11) 
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Figure 15: Supra/transnational Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media) 
 
        In the meantime, in line with growing electoral ambitions of the Welfare Party, 
claims were made asking for arrangements allowing Turkish citizens residing in 
Germany to vote for Turkish elections in Germany and against the repressive policies 
of the Kemalist establishment against pious Muslims. (e.g. the headscarf issue)   
       With financial and electoral help from Milli Gorus supporters in Germany, the 
Welfare Party achieved a big success in March 1994 Turkish local elections. It won 28  
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mayorships, 6 major metropolitan centers and leadership of 327 local governments. 
Nationwide, it received 19 percent of the total vote. In the 1995 general elections, it 
obtained 21.4 percent of the vote, gaining seats in the parliament and formed a 
coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party in July 1996. 
        Not surprisingly, disputes between the two partners over legislation were 
intensified by a crisis created by Welfare Party mayors and deputies, whose anti-
secular rhetoric and activities agitated secular public opinion. During these years, Milli 
Gorus Germany supported its Turkish counterparts with claims on policies of the 
Kemalist establishment trying to counter anti-secular tendencies of the Welfare Party. 
For Milli Gorus, which saw a solution to the Kurdish problem in Southeastern Turkey 
in Islamic brotherhood between the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority, 
proposals and demands related to the Kurdish ignited terror in Southeastern Turkey 
were also common.   
         However, the Welfare’s Party’s days in power were about to come to an end. 
The tensions between the military and the Welfare Party and the antagonism between 
the Islamists and secular public opinion escalated. These tensions culminated in the 
National Security Council’s February 28, 1997 decisions that called for an end to 
Islamist activities. This so-called postmodern coup
17 is usually designated as a turning 
point in the strategies of the Islamist movement in Turkey (Dagi, 2004). The coup and 
the following developments led to Necmettin Erbakan’s banning from politics and the 
Welfare Party’s closing down in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that it violated the principles of secularism and the Law of Political Parties.   
                                                 
17 In 1997, the Turkish army has intervened to force Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin 
Erbakan, from power. This intervention has been called a soft coup or a post-modern coup by many 
scholars, academics and intellectuals.   
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Figure 16: Home country related claims of Milli Gorus Germany. (In organizational 
media) 
        These important developments were of course interpreted as threats by Milli 
Gorus Germany. Milli Gorus Germany claims making on home country issues 
doubled in 1998 (See Graph 12) as a response to policy initiatives taken by the secular 
establishment in an effort to curb Islamic activism. (i.e. the closing down of the 
Welfare Party, the headscarf issue, the prisonment of Tayyip Erdogan, proposals on 
educational reform) However, as manifest in the content of Milli Gorus claims 
between 1997 and 1999, such important threats which can be identified as 
developments strong enough to change the trajectory of political Islam in Turkey were 
not seen as more important than threats and opportunities emerging due to 
developments in the host country. Instead of single handed fight against the secular 
establishment in Turkey, IGMG chose to direct more power and resources to activities 
against the proposed “child visa” law of the German government in 1997, for 
achieving voting rights in 1998 and for the right to give religious classes in public 
schools in 1999. The addressees of Milli Gorus claims between 1996 and 1998 also 
point to an increasing host country orientation as the proportion of host country 
institutions and authorities as addressees more than tripled. (See Graph 13)  
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 Figure 17: Addressees of Milli Gorus Germany claims. (In organizational media) 
 
      According to Schiffauer (2004), the coup in Turkey, the end of the myth of return 
and the failure of Islamic holdings in Turkey have all contributed to a change in the 
ideological orientation of Milli Gorus which in turn has contributed to a decrease in 
the relative importance of claims making in response to threats and opportunities 
arising in Turkey.  
         According to my interviews, another major cause of this reorientation towards 
Germany is the demographic change within Milli Gorus through which the second 
generation has come to power, believing that Germany is their home and that they as 
Muslims are more privileged in Germany than in Turkey, enjoying many freedoms 
that their counterparts in Turkey lack. For this new generation of IGMG
18 leaders, a 
total identification between Turkishness and Muslimness is broken. Supporters are 
instead encouraged to take German citizenship and engage themselves in the Muslim 
world society. A world oriented global politics instead of a Turkey oriented party 
politics is being played out by the second generation IGMG leaders since the end of 
the 90s.  
                                                 
18 I use IGMG and Milli Gorus Germany interchangeably.  
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          This orientation towards the global Islamic community of umma makes the 
Chechen war beginning at the end of 1999 and continuing full force in 2000 an 
important mobilization igniting development for Milli Gorus. While 
supra/transnational claims and supra/transnational addressees are high in these years 
due to the Chechen war, host country related claims never lose their importance while 
homeland country related claims show a declining trend after this date with the 
declining identification of IGMG with the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey. As I will 
discuss later, with a reorientation towards the host country, even the repercussions of a 
global phenomenon, September 11, start playing itself out in the national public sphere 
in Germany. As a result of the internalized effects of September 11 in Germany, 
IGMG comes under increasing attack by the German media and by German state 
agencies and responds to these attacks by addressing national authorities, using 
nationally bound frames.        
          In the meantime, a major power struggle was playing itself out in Turkey. A 
new party, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was founded by 33 former Welfare Party 
deputies under the leadership of Recai Kutan on December 17, 1997. However, the 
ban imposed on Erbakan enabled some party members to break free from his direct 
influence and enabled the reformists to publicize their discontent with the policies of 
the traditionalists. Soon after the founding of the party, the power struggle led to the 
resignation of the party’s young reformists (Cemil Cicek, Ali Coskun, Abdullah Gul 
and Abdulkadir Aksu) on July 26, 1999. The movement was eventually divided into 
two parties after the closure of the Virtue Party: the traditionalists’ Felicity Party 
(Saadet Partisi, founded on July 20, 2001) and the reformist Justice and Development 
Party(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, founded on August 14, 2001.  
          The traditional wing that opted for staying with Erbakan tried to de-Islamize its 
discourse, emphasizing a discourse that avoided any societal tensions, and taking a  
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low profile, non-confrontational and moderate stance. Recai Kutan, the party leader 
went as far as declaring that “They will not be a party to any conflict and they will not 
bring up the issue of the headscarf even though it is the right thing to do so.” (Milliyet, 
September 22, 2001)The party claims to endorse democracy and the idea of a “non-
ideological state” as the basic principles of the modern world. “We know what it is 
like to be threatened, blackmailed and silenced and therefore no one could value 
democracy better than us.” said Recai Kutan. (Milliyet, October 11, 2001) However, 
their understanding of democracy remains self-servingly restrictive to legal and 
constitutional amendments that would make the closure of the parties difficult and 
remove the ban on Erbakan’s political activities. (Dagi, 2004) 
         In the meantime, the reformist Justice and Development Party which has been in 
the government since 2002 elections persistently rejects being Islamist, defines itself 
as a conservative democratic party, emphasizes the democratic character of the party 
organization, and the importance of consensus-seeking in politics. During all this 
turmoil within the Milli Gorus movement in Turkey, IGMG has totally distanced itself 
from Turkish politics and Milli Gorus Turkey by formally breaking its ties with the 
official Milli Gorus newspaper, Milli Gazete. With a decreasing ideological 
orientation towards Turkey, the response of IGMG to important developments in 
Turkey has been a negligible number of claims related to Turkey. The remaining 
limited number of claims on Turkey have been related to Turkey’s membership in the 
EU only, as IGMG shies away from making claims related only to Turkish internal 
politics as they believe:  
“Our homeland is here, we live here, why should we make claims on Turkey? If we 
have problems, it’s in Germany and if we are going to have solutions to those 
problems, it’s going to be here in our homeland.” (Interview with an IGMG member 
in Walldorf, July, 2006)  
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 A CASE OF INTERNALIZATION: EFFECTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON MILLI 
GORUS CLAIMS MAKING 
       I have shown above how certain objective change processes and not others are 
interpreted as threats and opportunities by contentious groups due to the influence of 
the ideological orientations and identifications of these groups. Below, I show how 
ideological orientations and identifications of contentious groups take part in another 
mechanism: the internalization of international pressures.  
       In his book The New Transnational Activism, Tarrow (2005) discusses the conflict 
over the wearing of the headscarf in France as a case of internalization of the conflicts 
that have risen in response to global political Islamism. As in the case of political 
Islamism, when international pressures and conflicts penetrate into domestic politics, 
Tarrow (2005) calls this a case of internalization. He argues that international 
pressures leading to internalization can take a variety of forms; including international 
events like the kidnapping of the French journalists in Iraq or the imposition of 
common standards and rules of behavior by international institutions like the European 
Union.  
        I argue that in Germany,  internalization plays itself out not as an outcome of 
pressures from an institution but as an outcome of an event affecting world politics in 
general and the German government in particular. September 11 and its repercussions 
in Germany show us how deeply penetrated domestic contention and international 
events have become. September 11 has not only changed the parameters of world 
politics completely, but has also changed the parameters of IGMG claims making 
through internalization.  
         In his book Tarrow (2005) shows that internalization creates triangular 
relationships among ordinary people, their governments and international institutions.  
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The particular mechanisms found in it are: external pressures, governments 
responding to these pressures through implementation of certain policies, and domestic 
group protests which target the government that responds to external pressures through 
certain policies. The process can end in repression by local governments against the 
protesting groups, concessions offered to them or brokerage on the part of 
governments between the citizens and international pressures/institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: A dynamic and interactive model of internalization. 
Source: Adapted from Tarrow, 2005. 
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authorities and the German mass media began looking more closely at Islam and 
Muslim communities. The gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and 
religious associations, became targets of state inspections and the subject of flashy 
newspaper articles depicting them as shelters for terrorists. IGMG in particular, came 
under intense suspicion from the German government. The increased interrogation 
from the German media can be seen in the increased number of references made to 
Milli Gorus in the media. While between 1990 and 2001 a Lexis Nexis search on the 
keyword Milli Gorus gives 448 results, a search between 2002 and 2005 produces 726 
references to Milli Gorus.  
         In December 2001, conservative Christian Democratic Union chair Angela 
Merkel publicly stated to the newspaper Bild that “foreigners who adopted German 
citizenship only in order to camouflage their membership in fundamentalist groups 
should have their German passport taken away.” (Bild, December 15th 2001) By 2002, 
the IGMG citizenship campaign urging immigrants to take on German citizenship had 
been recognized by the Interior Ministry and the Verfassunsschutz (Agency for the 
Protection of the Constitution) and it had been given a sinister significance: IGMG 
seeks to control German politics by establishing an Islamist political party. Given the 
size of the Muslim population in Germany (approximately 2.6 million) and the fact 
that IGMG is only one of several Turkish Muslim organizations, each of which has a 
very different membership base and different political or religious allegiances, 
agendas, and orientations often with no sympathy for IGMG and its agenda, the threat 
of an Islamist political party to the German state is hardly a credible one. (Pratt Ewing, 
2003) 
         The treatment of Muslim associations by both the German state authorities and 
the German media following September 11 has affected their claims making. 
Yurdakul (2006) argues that there have been different responses to this intense  
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surveillance. Some Muslim organizations, feeling threatened by the police raids and 
the journalistic hype, have minimized their interactions with the host society. (For 
example, VIKZ: Verband Der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V (Union of Islamic 
Cultural Centers) Many others, Milli Gorus being the most important one, have 
instead opened their doors to the members of Germany’s non-Muslim majority to 
demonstrate their innocence.  
         I argue that an already emerging host country orientation within Milli Gorus 
Germany has made internalization, where international pressures/events play 
themselves out in the domestic arena, possible in Germany. As a result, not only has 
Milli Gorus Germany opened up its doors to non-Muslims through “Open Door” days 
in the mosques; it has also reaffirmed its host country orientation as manifest in 
changes in its claims making which increasingly present a host country orientation. 
             Migrant minorities addressing claims at authorities and institutions 
transcending national borders is one of the most cherished signs of migrant 
transnationalism. Whether these addressees are international (the UNHCR), European 
(the European parliament) or represent a foreign state (e.g. the US government), one 
can find plenty of them in Milli Gorus claims especially before 2000. As seen in graph 
14 below, before 2000, the majority of IGMG claims making in Germany can be 
considered SUPRA/TRANSNATIONAL CLAIMS MAKING PAR EXCELLENCE 
with supra/transnational related claims also being addressed to supra/transnational 
authorities. However, beginning with 2000 and increasing in magnitude in 2003 this 
supra/transnational claims making par excellence has been on the decline, with the 
host country replacing supra/transnational institutions/ authorities as the addressee of 
even supra/transnational claims. After 2000, Milli Gorus has chosen to domesticate 
supra/transnational issues by increasingly addressing these claims to the host country.  
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 Another manifestation of migrant transnationalism is immigrant organizations making 
demands on national governments in the name of international legal conventions, 
ideologies and rights. As seen in graph 15, between 1990 and 2000, Milli Gorus has 
framed
19 its host country related claims in supra/transnational terms with as many as 
80% of frames used in host country related claims in 1998 referring to supranational 
rights/ideologies and to human rights. The percentage of human rights framed claims 
in this period has been particularly high (Between 13 to 50 % of all frames). However, 
beginning with 2001, the role of the human rights frame and supra/transnational 
frames has decreased significantly while a focus on host country frames have taken a 
stronghold in Milli Gorus host country related claims.  
            Host country related claims addressed to supranational/ transnational 
institutions, organizations and authorities are also a manifestation of migrant 
transnationalism. In the beginning of the 90s, claims made in response to the Nazi 
violence in Germany have been addresses to human rights organizations, to the world 
public and to the Western democratic world multiple times (41% of addressees in 
1991). The end of 90s (1997, 98, 99) has, in addition to the Nazi Violence, witnessed 
claims related to the proposed child visa for the children of Turkish residents being 
addressed to human rights organizations. (Between 9 to 19 %) Although never 
substantial, this supra/transnational addressing of host country related claims has 
completely disappeared in 2000 and beginning with 2001 host country related claims 
have become predominantly (96 to 100 %) addressed to host country authorities or 
institutions. (See Graph 16)      
 
 
 
                                                 
19 See Appendix B for data on Milli Gorus Germany frames.   
68 
  
1
0
0
%
1
3
%
5
6
%
5
0
%
6
9
%
5
0
%
4
%
6
%
8
%
5
0
%
2
4
%
2
7
%
9
%
1
1
%
4
%
2
8
%
0
%
0
%
4
%
6
%
4
%
2
9
%
1
1
%
1
0
%
2
%
1
0
0
%
7
1
%
4
7
%
2
5
%
7
5
%
4
8
%
6
7
%
5
0
%
6
7
%
8
8
%
6
2
%
7
3
%
2
0
%
6
9
%
1
0
%
5
%
4
0
%
2
2
%
3
3
%
3
3
%
1
3
%
2
0
%
1
5
%
4
0
%
1
1
%
6
%
2
5
%
2
5
%
2
0
%
1
9
%
1
3
%
2
0
%
2
3
%
1
1
%
1
2
%
3
8
%
1
2
%
1
2
4
1
3
3
7
1
1
2
8
1
4
1
1
9
2
2
2
1
4
9
2
5
2
6
2
1
3
5
2
0
2
3
3
1
1
8
0
%
1
0
%
2
0
%
3
0
%
4
0
%
5
0
%
6
0
%
7
0
%
8
0
%
9
0
%
1
0
0
%
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
H
o
m
e
H
o
s
t
 
S
u
p
/
T
r
a
n
s
n
.
H
u
m
a
n
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
M
u
l
t
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
i
s
m
I
s
l
a
m
i
c
 
O
r
d
e
r
s
T
o
t
a
l
 
C
l
a
i
m
s
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
0
:
 
F
r
a
m
e
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
h
o
s
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
 
o
f
 
I
G
M
G
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
5
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
(
I
n
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
e
d
i
a
) 
69 
  
 
0
%
8
%
5
0
%
1
9
%
3
3
%
8
%
2
9
%
4
%
7
3
%
4
4
%
9
1
%
8
5
%
9
6
%
9
6
%
4
1
%
1
5
%
5
6
%
5
%
4
%
2
5
%
1
7
%
2
7
%
1
0
0
%
4
1
%
1
0
0
%
9
5
%
7
5
%
7
1
%
7
3
%
6
7
%
8
3
%
1
0
0
%
5
0
%
9
2
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
1
0
0
%
9
%
1
9
%
1
2
4
1
3
3
7
1
1
2
8
1
4
1
1
9
2
2
2
1
4
9
2
5
2
6
2
1
3
5
2
0
2
3
3
1
1
8
0
%
1
0
%
2
0
%
3
0
%
4
0
%
5
0
%
6
0
%
7
0
%
8
0
%
9
0
%
1
0
0
%
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
H
o
s
t
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
H
o
m
e
H
o
s
t
 
S
u
p
/
T
r
a
n
s
n
.
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
s
t
a
t
e
T
o
t
a
l
 
C
l
a
i
m
s
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
1
:
 
A
d
d
r
e
s
s
e
e
s
 
o
f
 
h
o
s
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
 
o
f
 
I
G
M
G
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
1
9
8
5
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
5
.
 
(
I
n
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
e
d
i
a
) 
70 
          To summarize, supra/transnational claims by Milli Gorus after 2001 (Graph 14), 
the majority of which are in response to the anti-Islam feeling emerging after 
September 11, are increasingly addressed to host country authorities and institutions. 
Host country related Milli Gorus claims after 2001, the majority of which are direct or 
indirect responses to the effects of September 11, are also predominantly addressed to 
host county authorities using host country frames while the proportion of 
supra/transnational frames and addressees decrease. (Graph 15 and 16) 
          These trends in Milli Gorus claims making show that international pressures 
might not only play themselves out in the domestic arena but can also lead to a 
reaffirmation of an emerging host country orientation in immigrant groups. National 
governments respond to international pressures by certain policies and migrant groups 
respond to these threats or opportunities by addressing host country authorities and 
institutions and framing their claims in host country terms. However, internalization is 
only possible if a host country ideological orientation has emerged or is emerging for 
that particular group. If this orientation is lacking in a certain group, the outcome of 
these pressures can be, as Yurdakul(2006) shows, a total withdrawal from host country 
politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
        My discussion above shows that understanding migrant claims making 
necessitates long term case study analyses of the addressees, frames and type of claims 
of certain migrant groups.  While national citizenship models do have an influence on 
the nature of migrant claims making in a particular country, claims making strategies 
of particular groups are also influenced by home country, supra/transnational and 
intra-group changes.  
         My theoretical point of view differs from other claims making scholars in the 
way I treat these influences coming from different levels. I don’t treat them as static 
variables that lead to mobilization but I put them into motion and track and study the 
way they interact with each other. My empirical analysis shows that Milli Gorus 
Germany claims emerge as an outcome of broad change processes (national or 
international, local or global) which are attributed as threats and opportunities 
depending on the ideological/religious identification of group. Second, I show that 
extra-nation state pressures and events can unexpectedly lead to a very domesticated 
claims making due to internalization which I claim is dependant on an already 
emerging host-country orientation within the immigrant group.  
        I argue that my focus on dynamic processes and mechanisms linking the local 
and global not only helps us to trace and explain changes in the nature of Milli Gorus 
Germany claims making over time, it also enables us to understand the interaction of 
the local and the global. The global doesn’t always rule the local and the local doesn’t 
always rule the global. They interact in previously undetermined ways to affect 
migrant claims making through certain processes like attribution of threat and 
opportunity and internalization. These interactions between the local and the global 
create different claims making strategies over time and between different groups. Our  
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job should be to explain these dynamic interactions and to show in what ways they 
affect migrant claims making. In this way, our findings will be able to explain why 
different migrant groups in the same nation-state exhibit different migrant claims 
making strategies and the claims making strategies of the same migrant group do 
sometimes differ over time.  
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Appendix A (Methodological Appendix) 
 
           I considered acts by Milli Gorus Germany as claims and included them in the 
data set if they involved demands, criticisms, or proposals of any kind. Once the data 
set was ready, I categorized Milli Gorus claims according to what the claim was 
related to. I used three categories: “host”, “home” and “supra/transnational”. If the 
claim was about Germany it was coded as “host”. If the claim was about Turkey it was 
coded as “home” and if the claim concerned an issue outside these two countries, it 
was coded as “supra/transnational”. To be specific, the category “supra/transnational” 
includes claims related to the situation of Muslims/Islam in the world, any claim 
concerning a country other than Turkey or Germany, any claims about the situation of 
the humanity/world in general and any claims about a supra/transnational institution. 
          I also documented the addressees of these claims, categorizing them into four 
groups: “Home”, “host”, “supra/transnational” and “foreign country”. “Home” and 
“host” categories refer to claims addressed to Turkey and Germany, respectively. The 
category “supra/transnational” refers to claims addressed to supra or transnational 
institutions like the UN and the EU, or entities like “westerners”, “Muslims”, etc. The 
“foreign state” category involves states other than Turkey or Germany as addressees.  
         I also documented the frames used by IGMG in their claims. Snow and Benford 
define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the world 
out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, 
experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” 
(Snow and Benford, 1992) Frames are used “to underscore and embellish the 
seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what 
was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable” (Snow and Benford 1992: 
137). They also make diagnostic and prognostic attributions by identifying someone to  
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blame and by pointing out a general line of action to correct the problem. Finally, in 
addition to their punctuational and attributional functions, frames enable activists to 
articulate and align events and experiences in a unified and meaningful way. (Snow 
and Benford, 1992) 
         I came across six categories of frames used by IGMG in their claims. These 
categories were: “home”, “host”, “supra/transnational”, “human rights”, 
“multicultural” and “Islam”. A frame was coded as “human rights” only if it involved 
direct references to human rights as a supra/transnational right based on transnational 
conventions/institutions. If the frame made references to human rights protected by the 
Turkish or German constitution, this frame was coded as “home” or “host”, 
respectively.  
        A frame was coded as “Supra/transnational” if it made references to international 
institutions, treaties, rights and discourses like: “EU’ s anti-racism decisions”, 
“international law”, “Council of Europe Human Rights Report”, “International 
Declaration of Human Rights 2001”. 
         Like references to human rights, references to democratic rights, freedom of 
thought, freedom of religion, etc., were coded as supra/transnational only if the claim 
particularly mentioned their supra/transnational origins. If these frames involved 
references to national laws or rights they were coded as “host” or “home”.         
          Therefore; the claim: “Disregarding the international standards of democracy 
and secularism by closing down a political party due to an interpretation of secularism 
particular to Turkey is wrong. This act has enforced the beliefs of European countries 
about Turkey’s problems with democracy and human rights.” (www.igmg.de, 1998), 
has been coded as a host country claim with a supra/transnational frame.  
         However; “According to our constitution, it’s a crime to criminalize freedom of 
religion and thought. Freedom of religion and thought comes before one’s right to live.  
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The reason for the nation-state’s and the constitution’s existence is the protection of 
basic rights and freedoms. Criminalizing the freedom of religion and thought means 
questioning the existence of these very institutions.”, has been coded as a home 
country claim with a home country frame.  
          Frames were coded as “host” if they involved discourses specific to Germany 
(e.g.: “We are not foreigners”, “Integration not assimilation”, “Inter-religious 
dialogue”), or involved direct references to German laws or the German constitution.  
       Frames were coded as “home” if they involved discourses specific to Turkey (e.g.: 
“secularism, not laicism”, “militant secularism”) or references to Turkish laws or the 
Turkish constitution.   
          A frame was coded as “Multicultural” if it made references to multicultural 
discourses and rights like: “right to one’s own culture and religion.”, and frames were 
coded as “Islam” if they made references to the rules and orders of Islam. 
        For example, the claim: “We want institutions like the UN and the NATO which 
have condemned the Russian attacks, to intervene in Chechnya immediately and 
ensure the smooth operation of international help organizations.” (Milli Gorus 
Perspektive, 1993), was coded as a supra/transnational claim, having a 
supra/transnational addressee.    
        The claim: “We condemn the anti-democratic behavior of the Turkish 
government in disregarding the right of parents to choose their children’s education at 
a time when “human rights” has become so prevalent all over the world.” (Milli 
Gazete, 1998), was coded as a home country claim having a home country addressee 
with a human rights frame.  
        The claim: “We condemn the raid to the Darmstadt Turkish Islamic Culture 
Association’s mosque by the German police and we believe that the German police are 
going to change their behavior in the future. This event is a violation of religious  
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belief and practice rights present in Germany. We request an inquiry on the behavior 
of the police and call the German authorities to immediate action.” (Milli Gorus 
Perspective, 1995), was coded as a host country claim, having a host country 
addressee and a host country frame.  
          The claim: “We demand a world where everyone can live justly and where 
respect for human rights prevails.” (www.igmg.de , 2003),  was coded as a 
supra/transnational claim with a supra/transnational frame.  
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